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1           Introduction 
 
 
In April 2013, I took on the chairmanship of the Best Practice Principles Group (the 
“Committee”). Almost a year later, on 5th March 2014, the Committee published the 
final version of the Best Practice Principles for Shareholder Voting Research & 
Analysis (the “Principles”).2 The Committee has thus met the recommendation of the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”). 
 
This report makes the Committee’s work and discussions transparent; it aims to 
facilitate an understanding among market participants – in particular clients and 
issuers – of the reasoning behind the adopted Principles and Guidance. Moreover, 
the  report  serves  as  a  documentary  function  for  the  future  application  of  the 
Principles. Finally, it aims to enhance the insight into the functioning of the industry, 
in general. 
 
Given that not all market participants understand the Members’ working practices to 
the same level, I hope the report will assist in enhancing discussion and fostering an 
understanding of the challenges and opportunities of the industry. 
 
2           Group Composition and Work Organisation 
 
 
For the details of the Committee’s composition and work organisation, I refer to the 
 
consultation document from October 2013, which will continue to be available at the 
 
Committee’s website (http://bppgrp.info). 
 
 
1 Dr. iur. (Duesseldorf), LL.M. (Toronto), Dr. iur. Habil (Duesseldorf), Professor of Law. Propter Homines Chair for 
Banking and Securities Law, University of Liechtenstein; Director, Center for Business & Corporate Law, 
University of Duesseldorf. 
 
2 See Annex I and online Best Practice Principles for Providers of Shareholder Voting Research & Analysis 
(2014), available at  http://bppgrp.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/BPP-ShareholderVoting-Research-2014.pdf. 
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The Committee conducted six in-person sessions in 2013, which took place in March 
(Milan), April (Paris), July (Frankfurt), August (London), September (Paris) and 
October (London), and held additional conference call sessions in September and 
October. In 2014, the Committee met in person in February (Frankfurt) and via 
conference call in March. 
The Committee’s work began with a comparative review of European as well as 
international stakeholders’ expectations regarding the content of an industry code. 
Particular attention was given to the ESMA Final Report and Feedback Statement on 
the Consultation Regarding the Role of the Proxy Advisory Industry (‘ESMA Final 
Report’) published 19 February 2013.3 This was due to the fact that ESMA intends to 
review the development of the Principles by 2016.4 The ESMA Final Report also 
included input from ESMA’s Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group.5
After a set of draft provisions were outlined by the Chair based on these 
expectations, the Committee refined and improved this first draft in its meetings. 
Some provisions were subject to intense discussion within the Committee, which took 
account of stakeholders’ expectations as well as the working practices and 
operational necessities of the industry.  
In order to ensure the workability and practicability of the Principles and at the same 
time inform market participants and the public about the progress made, the 
Committee undertook a public consultation on the draft Principles (a summary of the 
feedback provided to this consultation is annexed to this report).6
                                                             
3 See ESMA, Final Report and Feedback Statement on the Consultation Regarding the Role of the Proxy 
Advisory Industry, ESMA/2013/84 (2013), available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2013-84.pdf. 
4 See ESMA, Final Report, supra note 3, p. 3 (“ESMA will review the development around the Code of Conduct by 
two years after the publication of this Final Report and may reconsider its position if no substantial progress has 
been made by that time”).
5 Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (“SMSG”), ESMA’s Discussion Paper on Proxy Advisors – Opinion of 
the SMSG, ESMA/2012/SMSG/25 (2012), available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2012-smsg-
25.pdf. 
6 For the Principles consultation paper, see Annex II. For the Feedback Report to the Principles consultation, see 
Annex III. For the non-confidential responses, see http://bppgrp.info/?page_id=111.
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3 Discussion Items 
This section provides an overview on the discussions surrounding the items that were 
most debated during the drafting of the Principles.  
While the decisions on each of the items were taken by the Committee members, the 
independent Chair took care to ensure the transparency of the process and asked for 
a detailed reasoning for each decision taken by the Committee. This report makes 
these reasons available to the public.7
3.1 Scope8
One of the most difficult questions discussed by the Committee was the scope of the 
Principles. 
There is not a legal definition of ‘proxy advice’ on which the Committee could rely; 
official documents describe the function of ‘proxy advisers,’9 but these definitions are 
unclear at the margin.  
The lack of clarity is due to the diversity and complexity of the industry:  
x The term ‘proxy advice’ used by ESMA, i.e. giving advice or making 
recommendations, does not apply to all members of the Committee.  
x In particular, some Committee members do not provide advice that tells 
investors what to do, but instead issue reports on topics predetermined by 
clients.  
x The variety of the industry renders it difficult to determine who is subject to the 
Principles and who is not. For example, some Committee members deliver 
raw data on governance issues to third-party service providers that add their 
own data to the former and thereby create new services. The Committee took 
the view that all links in the knowledge chain that intellectually contribute to the 
                                                             
7 Note that the following statements do not necessarily reflect the view of each of the Committee members. 
8 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 9, Scope & Definitions.
9 See ESMA, Discussion Paper: An Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry. Considerations on Possible Policy 
Options, ESMA/2012/212 (2012), available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2012-212.pdf, p. 7 (“These 
are firms that analyse the resolutions presented at the general meetings of listed companies in order to submit 
voting advice or recommendations on these resolutions to their clients.”);
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research report with the aim of helping investors make informed voting 
decisions should be subjected to the Principles.  
x The format and presentation of the research process varies; some industry 
members issue company-specific reports, others provide the same content to 
clients in the form of newsletters, email alerts or corporate governance ratings. 
The Committee took the view that the form in which the research results are 
provided is irrelevant for the scope of the Principles. 
x The ideology underlying the research varies, from shareholder-value 
orientation to social, environmental and governance (ESG), or from 
international to regional standards. The Committee decided that these 
considerations do not influence the scope of the Principles. To the contrary, 
the more diversity there is on the supply side, the more it can be ensured that 
investors’ views are reflected in the voting decision.  
x Investors can assign voting research and analysis to signatories to the 
Principles (‘Signatories’) that come closest to their own views, thus furthering 
efficiency in the market for voting research and analysis. 
x The research methodology varies. Some industry members rely to a large 
extent on governance models and quantitative approaches, while others 
emphasize qualitative factors and personal judgement. Other industry 
members will use a blended approach. 
x Some industry members work under specific direction provided by clients as to 
how to treat certain agenda items (custom voting policies), while others 
develop their own view on agenda items in so-called ‘house’ voting policies. 
Some will work under both frameworks. 
x The regional scope of clients and services varies. Some industry members 
deliver services on stocks listed worldwide and serve clients from all 
jurisdictions, while other industry members focus on certain jurisdictions or 
cooperate with other industry members with regard to other jurisdictions. 
x Clients use the services differently. Some clients primarily use the services as 
a research tool to form their own decisions. Other clients, in particular 
institutional clients with smaller holdings,10 may rely on the industry’s services
                                                             
10 See Institutional Investor Committee (“IIC”), Investors’ Use of Proxy Advisory Research: The view of the UK
Institutional Investor Committee (2014), available at
http://www.iicomm.org/docs/Investors_Use_Of_Proxy_Advisory_Services_IIC.pdf, p. 2. 
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to a greater extent and conduct reviews of the services provided. Moreover, 
some clients rely on the services provided by multiple industry members 
simultaneously11 and make their own voting decisions based on a careful 
consideration of: (i) their own internal research and engagement with 
companies; (ii) the reports of all of these providers; and (iii) other data 
available to them. 
x Some industry members provide a number of additional services together with 
their core service. These services include:  
o Vote agency (i.e., assisting the investor to transmit votes to the 
meeting, in particular in cross-border settings);12
o Proxy voting services (i.e., voting as proxy on behalf of clients 
physically at the meeting);  
o Engagement services (i.e., communicating with issuers to ensure that 
the interests identified by investors or the industry members are 
adequately addressed by the issuers’ management);13 and,  
o Governance consultancy to issuers and investors, including, for 
example, the identification of governance-related risk factors.  
x However, no industry member engages in ‘proxy solicitation’, be it on behalf of 
issuers or shareholder proponents. Furthermore, a permanent voting coalition 
with a particular group of shareholders or issuers would be deemed not in line 
with the Principles, as this would create an undue bias on the part the 
Signatory.  
x The charging model varies. Some Signatories charge clients flat fees, while 
others charge per meeting or per report. In some cases, the flat fee includes 
other services provided to clients, such as vote agency and shareholder 
engagement. In other cases, Signatories generate income from other sources 
                                                             
11 E.g. 38% of institutional investors do that, see IIC, Investors’ Use of Proxy Advisory Research, supra note 10, p. 
2. 
12 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 10, Vote Agency.
13 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 10, Engagement & Governance Overlay Services.
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than the investors (such as voting platform providers, newsletter providers or 
securities brokers). 
For these reasons, the Committee looked for an all-encompassing, neutral term or 
definition that covers all provided services.  The Committee determined that the core 
function of their services is an intellectual contribution to investors’ voting decisions at 
shareholder meetings. In its first draft, a wider set of concerns – all corporate 
governance issues – were considered and hence the first draft related to ‘governance 
research’.
The consultation feedback, however, revealed that this all-compassing approach 
created confusion.14 The Committee therefore reviewed its initial approach and 
excluded a number of services that some respondents had understood to be within 
the Principles’ scope, when that had not been the Committee’s intention.15 In 
particular, it was clarified that credit rating agencies, as well as asset managers and 
asset owners conducting research for their own use, were not within the scope. 
Further, the Committee clarified that shareholder voting research and analysis may 
include services relating to ESG issues. ‘Governance research’ was therefore 
amended to ‘shareholder voting research and analysis.’
With these amendments, the Committee ensured the scope of the Principles is more 
closely aligned with the scope initially set out in the ESMA Final Report.
Moreover, it was highlighted that in all cases of voting analysis, advice or 
recommendations, investor interests are paramount. A fair representation of investor 
interests is, therefore, the guiding rationale throughout the Principles. 
3.2 General Approach 
The Committee decided in favour of a structure of the Principles that reflects the main 
concerns expressed in the ESMA Final Report, in particular the three areas that have 
been at the heart of the policy discussion surrounding the industry:  
(i) Quality of service;  
                                                             
14 Accordingly, the Committee determined the Principles should apply to “Governance Research Providers”.
15 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 9, Scope & Definitions.
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(ii) Conflicts of interests; and,  
(iii) Communication with issuers and the public.  
Within this structure, the Committee ensured that each of the concerns was 
addressed with appropriate care.  
Another main objective was to enhance transparency and understanding of the 
industry and its services. The Committee thus decided in favour of a ‘Comply-or-
Explain’ disclosure approach. On each of the three main items – quality of service, 
conflicts of interest and communication with non-clients – Signatories must describe 
their own approach toward research methodologies, conflicts of interest and 
communication policy, and disclose related policies on their websites. 
While some respondents to the consultation demanded non-discretionary rules of 
conduct, the Committee perceived such a uniform application of the Principles across 
the industry as undesirable, as it would interfere with a pro-competition approach to 
the provision of services. In contrast, a certain level of flexibility supports innovation 
and value creation.  
However, certain key rationales of the Principles are not subject to Signatory 
discretion. This applies in particular to the Signatories’ core commitments: 
x Signatories assist investors in exercising their rights and, as such, investor 
interests must be paramount at all times;16
x Proxy solicitation for any specific industry grouping or shareholder proponent 
is not in line with industry best practice;17 and, 
x Signatories must have public policies regarding their research methodologies; 
disclosure and management of conflicts of interest; and communication with 
parties other than clients, in which they explain their approach to the Principles 
and Guidance provided in the Principles.18
                                                             
16 See e.g. the Principles, supra note 2, p. 12, Principle One: Service Quality.
17 See the Principles, supra note 2, p.9, Shareholder Voting Research & Analysis.
18 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 11, The Best Practice Principles (“Signatories provide services that are 
delivered in accordance with agreed client specifications”).
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3.3 Delineating Responsibilities19
Another concern aired in the policy discussion related to the perception of the alleged 
“undue” influence the industry has on voting outcomes.20 After in-depth discussion, 
the Committee determined that it could not give a conclusive answer as to how much 
influence the industry as a whole or individual members have on voting outcomes, 
due to the different use of information by clients and how the wider market can report 
or comment on shareholder matters.21
For example: Investors may have their own custom policies; as such, it is not the 
Signatory who is influential. If investors make their own voting decisions by 
simultaneously using input from multiple industry members (on either a custom or 
house policy basis) and additional own research, as many investors do, should the 
voting outcome be deemed influenced by the industry? If raw data is provided to 
third-party service providers which then add their own data or opinions before issuing 
voting advice to their clients, should the influence be assigned to the provider of the 
raw data or the aggregating service provider? How should the fact that some clients 
exercise due care and cautious judgement before voting,22 while others may, on an 
occasional basis, accept the voting advice after a brief review or without further 
scrutiny be factored in?23
                                                             
19 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 8 -9, Introduction to the Principles.
20 See, for example, Cindy R. Alexander; Mark A. Chen; Duane J. Seppi & Chester S. Spatt, Interim News and the 
Role of Proxy Voting Advice, 23 The Review of Financial Studies, No. 12 (2010), or Tamara C. Belinfanti, The 
Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 Stan. J.L. 
Bus. & Fin. 384 (2009), Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: 
Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 Journal of Accounting Research, Nr. 5,951–996 (2013). 
21 See, also, IIC, Investors’ Use of Proxy Advisory Research, supra note 10, p. 2 (stating that “[n]ot a single 
respondent to the IMA’s 2013 survey indicated that they always follow the recommendations of their proxy 
advisory service. “); Ahern, Kenneth R. & Sosyura, Denis, Rumor Has It: Sensationalism in Financial Media,
(2014), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2264468 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2264468. 
22 E.g., Ninety percent of Association of British Insurers (ABI) members state that their vote decision-making 
process involves active participation by portfolio managers or investment analysts, see IIC, Investors’ Use of 
Proxy Advisory Research, supra note 10, p. 2. 
23 Signatories do not have complete information on the clients’ thought processes or internal procedures. 
Although some signatories can identify which research reports have been opened, they are unable to identify in 
which cases clients have voted in line with Signatories’ research without further analysis and in which cases the 
recommendations were subject to further review prior to confirming the vote intention. 
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The Committee concluded that, as correlation cannot be deemed to be causation, if 
investors exercise their own independent judgement, consistency between voting 
advice and voting outcome is, to a great extent, evidence that the research and 
analysis is in line with investor requirements and interests rather than evidence of 
undue influence on the part of Signatories. Accordingly, it is a core assumption of the 
Principles that investors comply with the standards of care as provided for in 
legislation and best-practice codes of conduct24 for institutional investors. 
It is not the function of the Principles to second-guess or correct the level of 
compliance exercised by institutional investors, nor has the Committee the power to 
impose additional duties and obligations upon their clients.25 However, Signatories 
recognise that institutional investors may be subject to disclosure requirements of the 
use made, if any, of shareholder voting research and analysis services. Signatories 
should be willing to assist their clients with respect to their own disclosure 
requirements on the discharge of their stewardship responsibilities. 
3.4 Local Standards26
The adherence to local standards has, in the eyes of the Committee, several 
dimensions.  
First, there are the mandatory laws and listing rules. All Signatories recognise that 
they, as well as issuers, are subject to the minimum standards of conduct set forth by 
such laws and rules.27
                                                             
24 See, for example, Financial Reporting Council (“FRC”), The UK Stewardship Code (2012), available at
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.pdf. 
25 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 8 -9, Introduction to the Principles.
26 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 11, Principle One: Service Quality.
27 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 9, “Nothing in these Principles is a substitute for adherence to relevant laws 
and market regulations”.
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Second, there are the recommended standards or best practice principles set by 
local standard setters. These standards may or may not reflect investors’ interests. If 
investors have determined how to deal with local standards and request custom-
tailored explicit guidance from Signatories on how to treat local standards (as they 
usually do with custom-voting policies), it is not within the Signatories’ discretion to 
decide in favour or against the clients’ preferences (may they be in line with local 
standards or not). If shareholders intend to vote in line with local standards, they are 
free to do so and direct the Signatories accordingly. 
Signatories have discretion on how to treat local standards only within their house 
voting policies, i.e. when clients do not provide specific directions as to how to treat 
certain agenda items. Some service providers have such a house voting policy, while 
others act on client specifications, i.e. custom voting policies. Some Signatories 
develop country-specific guidelines as soon as the number of stocks covered in any 
one country exceeds a minimum threshold, others always use country-specific 
guidelines. These country-specific guidelines then reflect the specific situation in 
each country. 
Divergence between local standards and the country-specific guidelines of a 
Signatory does exist and, in the eyes of the Committee, should exist. The discretion 
to vote against local standards forms an integral part of the services Signatories offer 
to their clients because this is what investors request. The reasons for divergence 
may reflect the difference between local standards and international corporate 
governance standards, for example the ICGN guidelines28 or OECD principles29, or 
may be necessary to protect or enhance investors’ rights in that respective country. 
Nevertheless, local standards have an impact on the research methodology. In 
particular, even if a Signatory’s country-specific guidelines are not in line with the 
local standard, the local standard raises the standard of care to be applied by the 
Signatories.30 Diverging from local standards without recognition or a contextual 
                                                             
28 E.g. International Corporate Governance Network (“ICGN”), ICGN Global Corporate Governance Principles 
(2009), available at
https://www.icgn.org/images/ICGN/files/icgn_main/Publications/best_practice/global_principles/ICGN_Global_Cor
porate_Governance_Principles_2009_July_2013_re-print.pdf. 
29 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf. 
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explanation is not considered best practice. However, if Signatories develop their 
own view on certain local standards based on a consistent methodology that reflect 
client interests, Signatories reserve the right to deviate from local standards.31
3.5 Conflicts of Interest32
One of the key concerns raised by respondents to the consultation is the problem of 
conflicts of interest and, in particular, the practice of some industry members to serve 
issuers and clients simultaneously.  
The Committee discussed the option of banning this practice but could not identify a 
legal basis for such a prohibition. Under the comply-or-explain approach, Signatories 
could still deviate from such a requirement and consequently these practices would 
persist. Instead, the Committee decided to require particular scrutiny and care in 
identifying and mitigating the harmful effects of potential and actual conflicts of 
interest.  
While some respondents said the Principles should require conflicts to be disclosed 
on Signatories’ websites, such disclosures could exacerbate the conflicts-of-interest 
risk. This is because a Signatory’s staff learning about business relations may cause 
the staff to adjust their behaviour to the detriment of the Signatory’s research 
neutrality. Instead, the Committee opted in favour of an organisational and client-
oriented approach.33
First, Signatories should organise their firms with special regard to potential conflicts 
and implement measures to mitigate such conflicts, such as information barriers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
30 It is the Committee’s view that guidelines that do not take into account local standards are not in line with 
adequate research principles, if the industry member is not aware of the local standards due to a lack of expertise 
for this country or if the industry member cannot account for the deviation of the guidelines from the standards by 
reference to international standards or investors’ interest. ‘Blind’ disregard of local standards is deemed not in line 
with these Principles. 
31 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 13, Research Methodology (“Signatories should have and disclose a written 
research methodology that comprises the following essential features:[…] The extent to which local conditions 
and customs are taken into account”).
32 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 16, Principle Two: Conflicts-of-Interest Management.
33 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 16, 17, Conflicts-of-Interest Policy, Conflict Management & Mitigation.
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Second, the fact that a Signatory advises investors and issuers simultaneously 
should be publicly disclosed.34
Based on this disclosure, investor clients can make an informed decision to either 
rely on the research on issuers that are the subject of a Signatory’s voting research 
and analysis or opt to refrain from taking research in cases where a potential conflict 
exists. With or without specific arrangements, such conflicts should be disclosed at 
the latest at the same time the research report is sent to investor clients. 
4 Communication with issuers 35
One of the most intensely discussed topics inside and outside the Committee relates 
to communication between Signatories and issuers. Communication practices differ 
widely within the industry. 
4.1 Issuer – Signatory Relations 
Issuer-Signatory relations take two primary forms:  
x Mutual communication regarding Signatory policies and views on governance 
matters specific to a company. For example, Signatories discuss their policies 
and -- possibly -- specific concerns regarding governance matters at the 
issuer, while issuers explain their rationales for supporting directors, a specific 
remuneration policy, and other governance matters. This communication 
typically (and preferably) happens outside the ‘convocation’ period after the
meeting agenda is released. 
x Communication of alleged factual errors and omissions in a Signatory’s 
research reports by an issuer or its advisors to a Signatory. This notification to 
the Signatory by the issuer/issuer advisor could result in a) a public follow-up 
disclosure by the issuer to clarify something that was not well communicated, 
b) a correction to the research by the Signatory; or c) nothing at all. This 
communication happens following the distribution of research reports and 
throughout the year following, whenever an alleged factual error is identified.  
                                                             
34 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 16, Conflicts-of-Interest Policy (“Signatories should have and disclose a 
conflicts-of-interest policy that explains: The existence of potential material conflicts; …“).
35 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 18, Dialogue with Issuers, Shareholder Proponents & Other Stakeholders.
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Both types of communication with issuers may, under certain circumstances, foster 
better understanding on the part of Signatories of the governance structures/activities 
of issuers and, on the part of the issuers, of the policies and relevant factors used by 
Signatories in evaluating those structures. In particular, the latter allows issuers to 
correct alleged factual errors in their agenda or provide required, expected or 
supplementary items in the corporate documentation. These benefits must be 
weighed against a number of downsides. 
First, any obligation to communicate with issuers and/or shareholder proponents 
creates the risk of Signatories getting unduly influenced to the detriment of their 
clients. In particular, investors (the clients of the Signatories) expressed concerns 
during the consultation that issuers could unduly influence industry members, 
especially during the convocation period; this would reduce the value of the 
Signatories’ services for investors and create additional costs on the side of 
investors.36
Second, during the proxy season, a number of legal concerns render communication 
between Signatories and issuers difficult. In particular, any additional information 
provided by the issuer to one or more Signatories must be scrutinised in light of laws 
against insider trading and market abuse while issuers must take into account 
company law provisions on equal treatment of shareholders. 
Third, communication is not a purpose in itself but imposes costs on Signatories. In 
order to justify these additional costs, communication should enhance the quality of 
services provided to clients.37 The Chair emphasizes that any obligation to 
communicate with issuers and/or shareholder proponents would impose fixed costs 
that are particularly severe for small service providers and may even force some of 
them to stop offering their services. Any additional fixed costs create a barrier to entry 
for new entrants and would inhibit competition in the market for shareholder voting 
                                                             
36 See Feedback Report, p. 24, 26. 
37 The Chair notes that from the service providers’ point of view an issuer’s improved understanding of the 
Signatories‘ approaches – which are closely aligned with and thus reflect the view of most investors – is a mere 
byproduct of their services provided to their clients, though a very valuable one for corporate governance. In 
essence, this creates a positive externality of the services provided to clients, as the social benefits generated by 
the Signatories‘ services in promoting better corporate governance may exceed the Signatories‘ private benefits 
(as measured by the Signatories‘ fees).
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research and analysis. Both the risks and the costs are particularly significant in the 
convocation period.  
While all Committee members agree that good relations between issuers and 
Signatories are desirable, the Committee’s view was unanimous that the time 
between the convocation of the meeting and the general meeting of shareholders is
typically not an appropriate time to discuss policies and governance matters with 
issuers.38 As a general principle, it is best practice to communicate with issuers and 
shareholder proponents about policies and governance matters prior to the release of 
the meeting agenda. Communication should be ongoing throughout the year, with the 
exception of the ‘proxy season.’ This limitation does not extend to communication 
regarding alleged factual errors or omissions (which may happen on both sides –
Signatories and issuers). 
4.2 Distribution of Reports 
The Committee is particularly concerned with demands to publish their research 
reports, or – which often comes to the same result – to forward their reports to other 
interested parties that do not license their services, including issuers and/or 
shareholder proponents and their advisors, such as lawyers, corporate governance 
consultants and proxy solicitors (hereafter collectively referred to as ‘Interested 
Parties’). The Committee is unanimous in rejecting any obligation to provide 
Interested Parties with free access to research results before or at the same time as 
distribution to their clients. In addition to the arguments discussed above for and 
against communication, three reasons are particularly relevant when discussing the 
mandatory distribution of research reports. 
First, as pointed out above, communication is justified if the benefits exceed the 
costs. According to the experience of those Signatories that communicate with 
issuers, a vast majority of the issuers’ remarks and comments (estimated at more 
than 90 percent) concern the opinion derived from the facts, rather than the facts 
underlying the opinion. Thus, in those instances, providing an advance review of 
reports is an inappropriate device to enhance the “reliability” of reports or the quality 
                                                             
38 Some Committee members infer that there may be instances where dialogue is appropriate during the 
convocation period, for example when analysing a contested agenda item, or when a company released 
additional information during the convocation period that needs clarification. 
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of service in general, but again raises concerns with respect to the most important 
asset of the service provider: its commitment to represent investor interests. 
Second, the reports contain intellectual property created by the Signatories that is 
derived from an extensive body of knowledge in the field of corporate governance 
collected over many years and over multiple countries and issuers. The Committee 
was informed about cases in which reports provided to issuers on a confidential basis 
were leaked to the press or the issuers’ own paid corporate governance consultants. 
Such misconduct undermines the business models of Signatories that heavily invest 
in knowledge creation and information processing. 
The Committee members emphasize that Signatories are private businesses – in 
contrast to public utilities – that write research reports and personal 
recommendations based on publicly-available information and provide them to their 
clients on a commercial basis. The delivery of this research and management of that 
delivery are cost-intensive activities. To the same extent as the expert opinions of 
lawyers, accountants, investment advisers and other consultants are not presented to 
parties that are not clients, mandatory access to Signatory research would infringe on 
Signatories’ intellectual property and reduce the incentives to invest in knowledge 
creation. Consequently, mandatory access to research report would reduce the 
overall service quality of shareholder voting research and analysis. 
Accordingly, while no Committee member allows for a preview by interested parties, 
the Committee deems all of the following procedures in line with best practice:  
x Making reports, if based on a house voting policy, available to issuers at the 
same time they are available to investor clients, either for free or for a fee;  
x Selling reports to advisors of interested parties, such as law firms, governance 
consultants and proxy solicitors; 
Signatories that provide services exclusively on a custom voting-policy basis find little 
use in discussing whether their clients’ preferences are in line with issuer 
expectations; indeed, such communication could be in violation of client 
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confidentiality agreements. Consequently, they refrain from distributing their reports 
to Interested Parties at all.39
4.3 Communication Policy 
It is clear from the above that approaches to communication are highly provider-
specific. Building on the principle of proportionality and adequacy, Signatories should 
be left to explain their own approach to communication. Signatories should set out in 
their communication policy how issuers may approach them to discuss their 
methodology, its application in specific cases, or report alleged factual errors. As the 
size and organization of Signatories varies, the Principles only require that such a 
communication policy should exist; it does not stipulate how such communication 
should take place. In particular, small Signatories can establish non-formal means of 
communication or provide a mere contact point for issuers and shareholder 
proponents for communication.  
The requirement that Signatories should disclose their voting policy, if they have a 
house policy,40 also furthers communication. As part of this, Signatories should set 
out their approach to reviewing their voting policies. Some Signatories may invite 
institutional investors, issuers, academics and other stakeholders to discuss their 
methodology at conferences, either virtual or in person, prior to the proxy season. 
Others, in particular smaller Signatories, may focus on feedback mechanisms and 
ensure the accuracy of their methodology by less costly means, such as relying on a 
literature survey on corporate governance and/or expert reviews.   
Despite the requirement to have a communication policy, the Committee 
acknowledges that circumstances do exist in which Signatories’ denying 
communication altogether is in line with best practice. In particular, if clients explicitly 
request that their service provider does not communicate with interested parties, 
doing so would violate contractual obligations. Moreover, if a research approach 
focuses on publicly accessible quantitative data,41 communication with issuers that 
                                                             
39 “It is for signatories to choose whether or not to engage in dialogue and in what format” see the Principles, p. 
18, Dialogue with Issuers, Shareholder Proponents & Other Stakeholders.
40 The point in time when Signatories disclose their policies is strongly influenced by their clients’ input.
41 Note that director elections, advisory votes on remuneration (also called “say-on-pay” votes) and shareholder 
proposals, among other matters, also require the analysis of qualitative data. 
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leads to qualitative data only would be meritless.  Nevertheless, the Committee is of 
the opinion that Signatories should have a communication policy that allows, at a 
minimum, the possibility to bring alleged factual errors and inconsistencies to the 
Signatory’s attention (note that Signatories are open to discuss alleged 
inconsistencies with regard to their research methodology outside of the convocation 
period).  
4.4 Competition Considerations 
On several occasions, the Committee discussed the impact of the Principles on 
competition within the industry.42 All industry participants are aware of the economies 
of scale that form part of the industry background; these are the same as the factors 
that create concentration in other information markets, such as for rating agencies or 
news agencies. 
Other than ensuring these Principles do not impact on EU competition law, in 
particular, the Principles have not been drafted with a view to changing the 
competitive environment. Since ESMA did not address competition issues in the Final 
Report, the Committee decided not to cover such issues either.  
5 Ensuring Compliance 
5.1 Comply or Explain43
As with many other industry codes, the Principles and accompanying Guidance 
operate on a comply-or-explain44 basis. Consequently, Signatories should observe 
both the Principles and the related Guidance.  
The Principles require Signatories to disclose their compliance statements and 
policies in one or more documents. 
                                                             
42 See the statement by the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (SMSG), in Final Report, supra note 3, 
Annex II, p. 32 (“To ensure a proper understanding of national law and the local environment and to ensure 
efficient competition, it is important to enable new and small local PAs to enter the market”).
43 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 7, Comply or Explain.
44 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 7, Comply or Explain.
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Signatories that intend to deviate from the Principles or Guidance are expected to 
explain their motives and reasons. Thus, albeit not providing a strict framework of 
“do’s and don’ts”, the Principles ask Signatories to inform market participants by way 
of disclosure that clearly articulates the reasons for non-compliance as well as any 
relevant alternative approaches.45
5.2 Compliance Review 
Given that the Committee is not a standing organisation, such as those representing 
investors’ or issuers’ interests, the Committee discussed extensively how to ensure
compliance with the Principles on an ongoing basis.  
Two models of compliance were reviewed: the private enforcement model and the 
public enforcement model.  
Under a private enforcement model, an industry-led organisation monitors the 
Signatories’ compliance and discloses statements of compliance to the industry body 
and/or market participants.  
Under the public model, a government-sponsored organisation takes on the 
compliance review.   
However, the Committee determined that the main disadvantage of the private model 
is that there is not a specific standing review body which covers the industry. 
Furthermore, its creation would prompt major discussions regarding representation of 
stakeholders, conflicts of interests of the review body’s members, the funding of the 
review body and the type of organisation that would be responsible for ensuring 
compliance.  
In the search for a straightforward, efficient, transparent and reputable long-term 
solution, the Committee members preferred to adopt a public-accountability model. 
The public model, however, faces challenges.  
                                                             
45 See the Principles, supra note 2, p. 7, Comply or Explain (“Signatories that choose not to comply with one of 
the Principles, or not to follow the Guidance, should deliver meaningful, relevant and detailed explanations that 
enable the reader to understand their approach”).
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Although the initial recommendation for the industry to self-regulate came from 
ESMA, the Committee believes that the Principles create value for worldwide market 
participants and the Principles’ scope should not be limited to the EU/EEA. 
Moreover, the Committee discussed requesting ESMA to monitor compliance with 
the Principles but a number of barriers came to mind, namely that, for a variety of 
legal reasons, ESMA does not have jurisdiction to supervise the compliance with the 
Principles and therefore would have no means of enforcement. A separate 
consideration was that linking the enforcement to one public institution could limit the 
Principles’ geographic scope. 
The Committee thus opted for a mixed model with four monitoring steps.  
1. Following completion of the drafting, consultation and finalisation of the 
Principles, the Signatories will, in a first instance, prepare their necessary 
disclosures. Signatories will be asked to support the Committee to facilitate 
compliance monitoring. In particular, each Signatory will provide their 
disclosures in a format to allow for a comparison that shows if and how each 
Signatory has implemented the Principles and its related Guidance. The 
comparison will be disclosed on the Committee’s website so that other 
stakeholders can review the implementation.  
2. A feedback mechanism regarding the application of the Principles will be 
provided on the Committee’s website. If a stakeholder believes that a 
Signatory has insufficiently implemented one of the Principles or the related 
Guidance, it may inform the Committee using the feedback mechanism. While 
the Committee has not decided on the procedures regarding the feedback 
mechanism, the Chair is of the view that the Committee can decide to make a 
stakeholder’s  grievance public together with a statement of disapproval 
regarding the Signatory’s non-compliance, while granting the respective 
Signatory the right to respond.46
                                                             
46 The Chair emphasizes that a ‘name and shame’ mechanism (that enables a stakeholder to publish a public 
statement alleging non-compliance of the Principles by a Signatory) would be difficult to implement in the context 
of a voluntary-code framework, if that framework is not managed by a standing industry organization with the 
resources to address legal or liability issues that would arise. These issues include: the respective Signatory’s 
right to appeal or respond to the publication of statement alleging non-compliance; an oversight body’s or court’s 
standing to intervene; the right of a Signatory to sue for damages in the case of unjustified statements of non-
compliance; and insurance protection for Committee members in the latter case. Note that all of these 
20 Report of the Chairman of the Best Practice Principles Group 
For competition reasons, the Committee members cannot comment on 
individual company research reports prepared by another Signatory. 
Complaints regarding the content of individual company research reports 
should therefore be directed to the relevant Signatory using their feedback 
mechanism.  
3. In September 2014, the Committee will reconvene to address the ongoing 
governance of the Principles, including (but not limited to) monitoring, 
enforcement, complaints and periodic review by public consultation. The 
Committee has determined that it will consider all appropriate measures to 
address the good governance and integrity of the industry as a whole. 
4. ESMA will perform a separate review of the implementation of the Principles, 
including their monitoring by the Committee, at the beginning of 2016. 
6 Next Steps 
This first (2014) edition of the Principles marks an end and a beginning. The drafting 
period ends and the working period of the Principles begins. Industry codes such as 
the Principles should evolve over time. The Committee has scheduled a first review 
of the Principles for September 2014. During that meeting, the members of the 
Committee will discuss the implementation of the Principles as well as further 
improvements to the Principles in light of their own experience as well as their clients’ 
or issuers’ feedback on the impact of the Principles.  
Two years from now – in spring 2016 – ESMA will review the effects of the Principles 
and assess whether they have adequately addressed its concerns. Should this not 
be the case, ESMA may proceed with more formal measures.  
As agreed at the beginning of the drafting process, my assignment ends with the 
finalisation and publication of the Principles. I sincerely hope that the Principles will 
achieve their purpose in enhancing transparency and mitigating conflicts of interests. 
I thank all members of the Committee for their contributions, ESMA for its logistical 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
particularities rest on jurisdictional and cost matters that do not lay in the hands of the Signatories alone. These 
matters could provide immovable barriers to a name-and-shame mechanism altogether. 
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support, Christina Preiner for her assistance during the consultation and reporting 
period, and all respondents to the consultations for their submissions. 
Dirk Zetzsche 
Düsseldorf (Germany) and Vaduz (Liechtenstein) 
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Part One: 
Introduction 
ESMA’s Call for Industry Self-Regulation 
Over the course of 2011, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority 
(“ESMA”) collected evidence from a 
variety of stakeholder groups with a 
view to understanding the state and 
structure of the market for shareholder 
voting research, suppliers’ 
methodologies and on possible 
European policy options. In March 
2012, ESMA published a consultation 
paper: ‘An Overview of the Proxy 
Advisory Industry. Considerations on 
Possible Policy Options1’, seeking 
further input from market participants. 
In the ‘ESMA Final Report and 
Feedback Statement on the 
Consultation Regarding the Role of the 
Proxy Advisory Industry’ (“ESMA Final 
Report”), published 19 February 2013, 
ESMA concluded that: 

1 ESMA 2012 Consultation Paper 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/content/Advice-
discussion-paper-Proxy-Advisors 
 
Following publication of the ESMA Final 
Report, a number of industry members 
formed the Best Practice Principles 
Group (“BPPG”) to develop a set of 
Best Practice Principles for Providers of 
Shareholder Voting Research & 
Analysis (“Principles”), which 
signatories to the Principles 
(“signatories”) should adopt on a 
comply-or-explain basis. 
The Principles are designed to help 
clients and stakeholders understand: 
x The nature and character of 
shareholder voting research and 
analysis services; 
x  The standards of conduct that 
underpin those services; and, 
x How signatories to the Principles 
interact with other market 
participants.  
The Principles are intended to 
complement applicable legislation, 
regulation and other soft-law 
instruments. 
The BPPG comprises the following 
members: 
x Glass, Lewis & Co. 
x Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. 
x IVOX GmbH 
x Manifest Information Services Ltd 
x PIRC Ltd 
x Proxinvest 
  
_______________________________ 
1 ESMA 2012 Discussion Paper - An Overview of the 
Proxy Advisory Industry. Considerations on Possible 
Policy Options. 
2 ESMA recommends EU Code of Conduct for proxy 
advisor industry: (Page 3 of the final report). 
“(I)t has not been provided with clear 
evidence of market failure in relation to 
how proxy advisors interact with investors 
and issuers. On this basis, ESMA currently 
considers that the introduction of binding 
measures would not be justified. However, 
based on its analysis and the inputs from 
market participants, ESMA considers that 
there are several areas, in particular 
relating to transparency and disclosure, 
where a coordinated effort of the proxy 
advisory industry would foster greater 
understanding and assurance among other 
stakeholders in terms of what these can 
rightfully expect from proxy advisors. Such 
understanding and assurance will help to 
keep attention focused where it belongs, 
namely on how investors and issuers can, 
from their respective roles foster effective 
stewardship and robust corporate 
governance, and ensure efficient markets. 
Consequently, ESMA considers that the 
appropriate approach to be taken at this 
point in time is to encourage the proxy 
advisory industry to develop its own Code 
of Conduct.2 
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The BPPG is led by an independent 
chairman, Prof. Dr. Dirk Andreas 
Zetzsche, LL.M. (Toronto), who is a 
professor of law and holds the Propter 
Homines Chair for Banking and 
Securities Law at the University of 
Liechtenstein. He is also one of the 
directors of the Center for Business 
and Corporate Law at Heinrich Heine 
University in Düsseldorf  
Prof. Zetzsche was selected by the 
BPPG after a public call for interest in 
the post and is independent from both 
the BPPG and ESMA. Prof. Zetzsche has 
no industry affiliations but extensive 
practical and academic experience with 
both shareholder voting and 
institutional investments. 
Whilst ESMA provided Prof. Zetzsche 
with logistical support, including 
granting him a daily allowance of 150 
EUR per meeting attended and 
reimbursing his travel and 
accommodation costs in connection 
with meetings, ESMA was not involved 
in the drafting of the Principles. Prof. 
Zetzsche undertook the role of BPPG 
Chair because of his interest in 
shareholder stewardship and fostering 
transparency of the voting process. 
While the Chair fulfilled an advisory 
and coordinating function, he did not 
interfere with the fundamental 
decisions with regard to the Principles; 
these decisions were made exclusively 
by the industry members of the BPPG. 
The BPPG operates an independent 
website (http://bppgrp.info) which is a 
central location for copies of the 
Principles together with any 
consultation-related materials. 
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Public Consultation 2013 
To refine the Principles and finalise the 
publication process, the BPPG sought 
feedback from potential signatories, 
institutional investors, issuers and 
other stakeholders during Q4 20133. 
The BPPG received 46 responses to its 
consultation. 
The BPPG reflected upon the responses 
to a variety of topical questions, 
including: 
x How the Principles could improve 
communication with stakeholders; 
x How stakeholders could better 
understand the way signatories 
operate and the services they 
provide; 
x Views on the proposed key 
Principles and related Guidance; 
and, 
x Views on the governance of the 
Principles including, the 
transparency of the process and 
possible further development of 
the initiative. 
Following a detailed review of the 
feedback, a number of amendments 
were made to the initial draft 
proposals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ongoing Monitoring 
The BPPG will perform on-going 
monitoring of the implementation of 
the Principles and will review the 
Principles and Guidance no later than 
two years following their launch. 
 
ESMA will perform a separate review 
of the implementation of the Principles 
and their monitoring by the BPPG at 
the beginning of 2016. 
The following pages reflect the 
results of the feedback and 
consultation process.
̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴
3 BPPGRP Consultation Responses 
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Part Two:  
The Best Practice Principles 
 
Background 
The charter signatories (see 
Appendix 1) of the Best Practice 
Principles for Shareholder Voting 
Research & Analysis Providers 
(“Principles”) have prepared and 
adopted the following Principles in 
relation to their services associated 
with the provision of shareholder 
voting research and analysis. 
In addition to promoting the integrity 
and efficiency of processes and 
controls related to the provision of 
such services, the Principles are 
intended to foster greater 
understanding of the role of service 
providers in the voting decisions made 
by institutional investors (i.e., asset 
owners and fund managers). 
New signatories beyond members of 
the BPPG are encouraged to adopt the 
Principles. 
In developing the Principles, the BPPG 
drew upon on a number of publicly 
available sources, including but not 
limited to: 
Regulatory Consultation 
x ESMA Final Report and Feedback 
Statement on the Consultation 
Regarding the Role of the Proxy 
Advisory Industry (19 February 2013) 
 
Investor Codes 
x AFG: Recommendations de 
l’Association Française de Gestion (FR) 
x BVI: Bundesverband Investment and 
Asset Management Rules of Good 
Conduct (DE) 
x Code for Responsible Investing in 
South Africa (“CRISA”) (ZA) 
x EFAMA: European Fund and Asset 
Management Association Code for 
External Governance (EU) 
x Eumedion: Eumedion Best Practices 
for Engaged Ownership (NL) 
x FRC: The UK Stewardship Code 
(September 2012), published by the 
Financial Reporting Council (UK) 
x ICGN: International Corporate 
Governance Network Statement of 
Principles on Institutional Shareholder 
Responsibilities (Global) 
x Lignes Directrices pour les 
Investisseurs Institutionnels 
(Economiesuisse and other Swiss 
organisations) (CH) 
x OECD: Organisation for Economic 
and Co-operation and Development 
Principles of Corporate Governance 
(Global) 
x PRI: Principles for Responsible 
Investment (Global) 
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Financial Markets 
Participants 
x AMF : Recommendation No 2011-06 
of 18 March 2011 in respect of proxy 
voting agencies issued by the Autorités 
des Marchés Financiers (FR) 
x CFA: Code of Ethics and Standards 
of Professional Conduct and Research 
Objectivity Standards (Global) 
x IIA: Institute of Internal Auditors’
International Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing 
(Standards) 1300 Series Regarding 
Quality Assurance and Improvement 
Programs (Global) 
 
 
Comply or Explain 
Not all Signatories offer the same 
services in the same way. For this 
reason, the Principles operate on a 
“comply-or-explain” framework. This 
enables each signatory to explain how 
the Principles relate to their specific 
circumstances and business model. 
The Principles are therefore not a rigid 
set of rules; rather they consist of 
three main Principles and 
accompanying Guidance.  
The Principles are the core of this 
document and the way in which they 
are applied should be the central 
question for each signatory as it 
determines how to operate according 
to the Principles.  
The Guidance recommends how the 
Principles are applied. 
Signatories that choose not to comply 
with one of the Principles, or not to 
follow the Guidance, should deliver 
meaningful, relevant and detailed 
explanations that enable the reader to 
understand their approach. The 
explanations should be substantiated 
and adapted to the signatory’s 
particular situation and should 
convincingly indicate why a specific 
aspect justifies an exemption. The 
explanations provided should state 
what alternative provisions have been 
made, if applicable. If a signatory 
intends to comply at a later stage with 
a measure from which it has 
provisionally deviated, it should state 
when this temporary situation will 
come to an end. 
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Application of the Principles 
Signatories to the Principles should 
publish a link to their Statement of 
Compliance with the Best Practice 
Principles (“Statement”), via the 
BPPG’s independent website. 
If they so choose, signatories may wish 
to issue their statements via other 
publicly accessible sources. 
Furthermore, ESMA has agreed to 
display on its website a list of entities 
that have advised ESMA that they are 
signatories to the Principles together 
with a link to the independent BPPG 
website. 
The Statement should: 
x Describe in a meaningful way how 
signatories apply the Principles and 
related Guidance; 
x Disclose any specific information 
set out in the supporting Guidance; 
and, 
x Where any of the Principles have 
not been applied or relevant 
information has not been disclosed, 
provide a reasoned explanation as 
to why. 
Signatories should review their 
Statement from time to time (at least 
annually) and update it as appropriate 
to reflect current practice and material 
changes. 
 
Introduction to the Principles 
Investors have a number of important 
ownership rights, one of which is the 
right to vote at company meetings. 
Voting is a key right of investors, whose 
effective discharge may also be a 
fiduciary responsibility. 
As with many other parts of the 
investment process, investors need 
access to information and 
administration tools that support them 
in the discharge of their 
responsibilities. 
Signatories provide a range of 
professional services designed to assist 
investors in the discharge of their 
rights and responsibilities. In the spirit 
of the comply-or-explain framework, 
the Principles set forth here are 
designed to facilitate transparency and 
assist signatories’ conduct in 
discharging their responsibilities 
toward clients. 
These Principles have been developed 
with the following considerations in 
mind: 
x The services are an efficient way of 
managing the logistical complexities 
associated with analysing and 
interpreting company disclosures, as 
well as ensuring and managing the 
operational aspects of shareholder 
voting. 
x Clients may use one or more 
services that support and 
complement their own in-house 
research activities; 
x Clients may, themselves, be subject 
to a variety of rules and regulations 
in relation to asset ownership and 
oversight; 
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x Signatories’ underlying clients are 
responsible for their own 
compliance procedures; 
x Signatories operate within the 
framework provided by applicable 
law, including those governing 
company law, contract law and 
client confidentiality, as well as 
securities laws associated with 
market abuse and insider trading; 
and, 
x Nothing in these Principles is a 
substitute for adherence to relevant 
laws and market regulations. 
 
Scope & Definitions 
To better understand the relevance 
and application of the Principles, it is 
important to understand the different 
types of services the signatories 
provide.  
x The key objective of the 
signatories is to support 
institutional investors in the 
exercise of their ownership rights 
and responsibilities through the 
provision of 
value-added services.  
x Services may be provided on a 
commercial, not-for-profit or 
membership basis. 
Shareholder Voting Research 
& Analysis 
Signatories analyse the corporate 
disclosures of listed companies with a 
view to informing investors’ voting 
decisions. Services include the 
provision of research, advice or voting 
recommendations, that relate 
specifically to the exercise of voting 
rights. 
The services may exhibit one or more 
of the following characteristics: 
x Data and analysis 
x Company-specific research, advice 
or opinions 
x ESG Ratings4 
x Policy guidance 
x Voting recommendations 
x Alerts, bulletins and newsletters 
Depending on the services subscribed 
to, the services may yield different 
results for different clients. This is 
because governance and ownership 
policies and preferences will vary from 
organisation to organisation. 
 
  
Irrespective of the type of services used to 
support ownership and voting activities, 
the ultimate responsibility to monitor 
investments and make voting decisions lies 
with investors; use of third-party services 
such as those provided by signatories does 
not shift this responsibility. 
 
Stakeholders wishing to understand how 
an institutional investor discharges its 
stewardship or ownership responsibilities 
should consult relevant disclosures of the 
investor to understand its approach. 
Unless otherwise stated or disclosed 
signatories do not act on behalf of any 
particular shareholder or group of 
shareholders that is trying to influence 
how other shareholders vote. Similarly, 
signatories do not act on behalf of an 
issuer that is trying to secure votes from 
its shareholders. 
____________________ 
4 Per para (20) Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 “ESG 
Ratings” do not constitute Credit Ratings.
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Additional Services 
In addition to shareholder voting 
research and analysis services, 
signatories may also provide other 
services, such as vote agency and/or 
engagement and governance overlay 
services. 
Vote Agency 
A voting agent provides shareholder 
vote execution services, whereby the 
voting agent is responsible for some or 
all of the logistical and operational 
activities associated with transmitting 
instructions from the institutional 
investor to the company meeting, as 
well as record-keeping and reporting 
activities.  
Votes may be transmitted to the 
meeting directly (including personal 
attendance) or through a chain of 
operational intermediaries, depending 
on regulatory or market specificities in 
each relevant jurisdiction. 
 
 
Engagement & Governance 
Overlay Services 
Engagement services are defined as 
undertaking contact and engagement 
with issuers on behalf of an investor or 
group of investors with a view to 
asking the company in question to 
amend aspects of its governance.  
Overlay services are defined as the 
provision of fully outsourced 
governance engagement and voting 
services to institutional investors. 
Vote agency, engagement and 
governance overlay service providers 
may provide shareholder voting 
research and analysis as part of their 
service. Where this is the case, the 
provisions of these Principles apply to 
the shareholder voting research and 
analysis services they offer, either on a 
standalone basis or in conjunction with 
other services.  
The particularities of vote agency and 
engagement services are not 
addressed by these Principles. 
 
Unless otherwise stated or disclosed, 
signatories act under the direct instruction 
of their clients and do not cast votes 
without their authority. 
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Part Two: 
The Best Practice Principles 

Principle One:  
Service Quality 
Signatories provide services that are 
delivered in accordance with agreed 
client specifications. 
Signatories should have and publicly 
disclose their research methodology 
and, if applicable, “house” voting 
policies.


Principle Two:  
Conflicts-of-Interest 
Management 
Signatories should have and publicly 
disclose a conflicts-of-interest policy 
that details their procedures for 
addressing potential or actual conflicts-
-of-interest that may arise in 
connection with the provision of 
services. 


Principle Three:  
Communications Policy 
Signatories should have and publicly 
disclose their policy (or policies) for 
communication with issuers, 
shareholder proponents, other 
stakeholders, media and the public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Principles are supported by 
Guidance that explains the 
background, relevance and 
application of the Principles.  
The comply-or-explain 
framework applies to both the 
Principles and the Guidance. 
Unless otherwise stated, all 
policies should be disclosed on 
the signatory’s website or made 
available on request. 
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Principle One:  
Service Quality 
Signatories provide services that are 
delivered in accordance with agreed 
client specifications. 
Signatories should have and publicly 
disclose their research methodology 
and, if applicable, “house” voting 
policies. 
Guidance 
Introduction 
x Signatories should explain how 
they organise their activities to 
ensure that research is developed 
in accordance with a stated 
research methodology and voting 
policies. 
x Signatories should describe what 
reasonable efforts they make to 
ensure their research and analysis 
are independent and free from 
inappropriate bias or undue 
influence. 
Responsibilities to Clients 
A signatory’s primary responsibility is 
to provide services to clients in 
accordance with agreed specifications. 
Clients are the ultimate and legitimate 
judges of the quality of shareholder 
voting research and analysis and other 
services they subscribe to from 
signatories. 
Quality of Research 
x Shareholder voting research and 
analysis should be relevant, 
accurate and reviewed by 
appropriate personnel prior to 
publication. 
x Signatories should be able to 
demonstrate to their clients that 
their reports, analyses, guidance 
and/or recommendations are 
prepared to a standard that can be 
substantiated as reasonable and 
adequate. 
x Signatories should have systems 
and controls in place so that they 
can reasonably ensure the 
reliability of the information used 
in the research process.  
x Signatories cannot be responsible 
for disclosures published by issuers 
or shareholder resolution 
proponents that are the subject of 
their research. 
x Signatories should maintain 
records of the sources of data used 
for the provision of services to 
clients (to the extent legally or 
contractually possible). 
x Signatories should implement 
proportionate organisational 
features to achieve adequate 
verification or double-checking of 
the quality of research that is 
provided. These may include: 
x Issuer fact-checking 
x IT-based consistency check 
x Four-eyes principle (i.e. reports 
reviewed by an appropriate 
second person) 
x Review by senior analyst 
x Review by governance 
committee 
x Review by senior management 
and/or executives. 
x Signatories should be transparent 
regarding the research information 
provided to clients, including, 
when applicable, dialogue with 
issuers or shareholder proponents 
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(see Principle 3). To that end, 
signatories should make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that 
use, inclusion or reproduction of 
external private information be 
duly referenced, so clients can 
assess to what degree third-party 
input plays a role in the services 
they use. 
Research Methodology 
Signatories should have and disclose a 
written research methodology that 
comprises the following essential 
features: 
x The general approach that leads to 
the generation of research; 
x The information sources used; 
x The extent to which local 
conditions and customs are taken 
into account; 
x The extent to which custom or 
house voting policies or guidelines 
may be applied; and, 
x The systems and controls deployed 
to reasonably ensure the reliability 
of the use of information in the 
research process, and the 
limitations thereof.  
In making such disclosure, signatories 
do not need to provide information 
that could harm the signatory’s 
legitimate business interests, including, 
but not limited to, intellectual 
property. 
Voting Policies or Guidelines 
Shareholder Policies 
x Shareholders may assess investee 
companies’ governance 
arrangements and make voting 
decisions based on their own view 
or “custom” voting policy. In this 
case, they may contract with a 
signatory to receive services based 
on their own voting policies. 
x Shareholders may subscribe to 
shareholder voting research and 
analysis services based on a 
signatory’s proprietary or “house” 
voting policies and subsequently 
decide on the extent to which they 
incorporate that research and 
analysis into their own assessment 
and decision-making process. 
 
Signatory Policies 
x Signatories may provide 
shareholder voting research and 
analysis services based on house 
voting policies or guidelines.  
These voting policies typically 
consist of high-level corporate 
governance principles against 
which the governance 
arrangements and general meeting 
resolutions of listed companies are 
assessed. 
x Signatories should disclose 
whether they have developed 
house-voting policies. If so, they 
should disclose these policies, 
including, but not limited to, the 
extent to which local standards, 
guidelines and market practices 
are taken into account 
(if at all) and the extent to which 
issuer explanations on deviations 
from comply-or-explain corporate 
governance codes are taken into 
account. Signatories should 
Whether shareholders use a signatory’s 
“house” or “custom” voting policies, they 
are always responsible for and entitled 
to exercising their own judgement when 
determining their final voting decisions. 
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indicate whether the scope of their 
research includes corporate 
transactions and/or environmental 
and social matters (“ESG” or 
“Sustainability”). 
x Each signatory will have its own 
approach to voting policy 
development and review, which 
may include one or more of the 
following approaches: 
x Client review 
x Public consultations 
x One-on-One/Face-to-Face 
discussions 
x Academic literature review 
x Guideline exposure drafts 
x Group discussions/webinars 
x Discussions at industry 
conferences 
x Signatories should explain how 
their voting policies are developed 
and updated. They should explain 
whether and how they incorporate 
feedback into the development of 
voting policies. They should 
disclose the timing of their policy 
updates and policies. 
x Signatories are not responsible for 
disclosing client corporate 
governance policies or voting 
guidelines and may have 
contractual obligations that 
preclude them from discussing any 
aspect of their client relationships, 
voting guidelines or intentions. 
x A signatory’s voting guidelines do 
not need to include information 
that could harm the signatory’s 
legitimate business interests, 
including, but not limited to, 
intellectual property. 
 
 
Employee Qualification & 
Training 
A signatory’s employees should have 
the education, skills, competence and 
experience that are appropriate for 
their positions. Signatories should 
make reasonable efforts to ensure 
their staffs are trained on the 
relevance and importance of their 
activities and on how they contribute 
to service delivery. 
Where a signatory outsources any 
process that could affect service 
quality, the signatory should exercise 
control over such processes. The type 
and extent of control applied to these 
outsourced processes should be clearly 
explained. 
Signatories should disclose their 
operational arrangements for the 
provision of services, including, for 
example, qualifications of staff, 
organisation of production processes, 
etc. 
Timeliness 
Signatories have a responsibility to 
provide clients with adequate and 
timely services, subject to the 
availability of source information from 
issuers and shareholder resolution 
proponents, as well as intermediary 
constraints (for example, vote 
deadlines and intermediary cut-offs). 
 
Whether services are provided on a 
“custom” or “house” voting policy basis, 
clients expect signatories to exercise 
their independent professional 
judgement when delivering shareholder 
voting research and analysis. 
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Signatories should make reasonable 
efforts to use the most up-to-date 
information available when delivering 
their services. 
Complaints & Feedback 
Management 
Signatories should have and disclose 
their policies for managing and 
responding to complaints, comments 
or feedback about their services. 
Client & Supplier 
Understanding 
The operational aspects of service 
delivery will generally form the basis of 
the service agreement between 
signatories and their clients. 
Signatories should notify clients of the 
scope of the services provided, as well 
as any known or potential limitations 
or conditions that should be taken into 
account in the use of signatory 
services. 
Limitations may include: 
x Data availability issues, as not 
all markets require the same 
level of detail in disclosure; 
x Missing, inaccurate or 
incomplete documents or 
disclosures, such as from 
issuers or shareholder 
proponents; 
x Reliance on third parties that 
are beyond the control of the 
signatory; and, 
x Inconsistencies and 
irregularities of information 
provided by intermediaries in 
the ownership chain, such as 
agenda information, vote 
deadlines, blocking procedures, 
etc. 
Signatories should provide clients with 
a framework that enables them to fulfil 
their due-diligence requirements. The 
framework could include the following: 
x Site visits; 
x Interaction with research 
teams; 
x Information on quality controls 
that govern the research 
development process; 
x Information on the 
qualifications and experience of 
the signatory’s staff; and, 
x Information on how the 
research framework has been 
or will be applied and on which 
assumptions the research 
output has been based. 
Client Disclosure Facilitation 
Signatories recognise that institutional 
investors may be subject to disclosure 
requirements of the use made, if any, 
of shareholder voting research and 
analysis services. 
Signatories should be willing to assist 
clients, upon their request, with 
disclosure relating to the clients’ 
discharge of stewardship 
responsibilities. This disclosure could 
include information on how an 
institutional investor client uses a 
signatory’s services; the public 
identification of a signatory; and 
information on the scope of services 
offered by a signatory, among other 
things. 
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Principle Two:  
Conflicts-of-Interest 
Management 
Signatories should have and publicly disclose a 
conflicts-of-interest policy that details their 
procedures for addressing potential or actual 
conflicts-of-interest that may arise in 
connection with the provision of services. 
Guidance 
Introduction 
The possibility for conflicts-of-interest 
can arise in all businesses. While 
conflicts cannot always be eliminated, 
they can be managed and mitigated. 
The overriding objective of this 
principle is to ensure, as far as 
reasonably possible, that research and 
business conduct are independent, fair, 
clear, not misleading and free from 
possible bias or undue influence. 
With this in mind, signatories should 
make full and timely disclosure of 
potential conflicts that could 
reasonably be expected to impair their 
independence or interfere with their 
duty to clients. 
Conflicts-of-Interest Policy 
Signatories should have and disclose a 
conflicts-of-interest policy that 
explains: 
x The existence of potential 
material conflicts; 
x How and when potential 
material conflicts will be 
disclosed to clients (for example 
on a website, contained within 
research reports, email 
bulletins, etc.); 
x How signatories communicate 
their conflicts-of-interest policy 
and train employees in the 
operation of that policy; and, 
x How conflicts will be managed. 
Possible Conflicts for 
Consideration 
Signatories should consider how the 
following non-exhaustive list of 
potential conflicts may materially 
impact their operations and how these 
potential conflicts may be addressed: 
x A signatory’s ownership or 
shareholder base/structure, 
such as when a signatory is 
owned by an investor that owns 
shares in companies under 
coverage or when the investor 
is owned by an issuer under 
coverage; 
x A signatory’s employee 
activities, such as board 
memberships, stock ownership, 
etc.; 
x Investor-client influence on the 
signatories, such as when an 
investor who is a client of the 
service provider is a 
shareholder proponent or is a 
dissident shareholder in a proxy 
contest; 
x Issuer-client influence on the 
signatories, such as when 
signatories provide consulting 
services to companies under 
coverage for research; and, 
x Influence of other investor 
clients. 
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Conflict Management & 
Mitigation 
Conflict management and mitigation 
procedures should include one or more 
of the following approaches: 
x Transparent policies and 
procedures 
x Code of ethics 
x Division of labour 
x Employee recusal 
x Fire walls/IT systems and 
controls 
x Information barriers and 
ring-fencing 
x Independent oversight 
committees 
x Physical employee separation 
x Separate reporting streams 
Conflict Disclosure 
If a signatory becomes aware of a 
material conflict of interest that cannot 
be effectively managed, the signatory 
should: 
x Disclose the conflict to the 
relevant client(s) without undue 
delay before or at the same 
time the service is delivered, 
subject to contractual 
arrangements; and, 
x Manage the conflict as further 
detailed in the signatory’s 
conflicts-of-interest policy. 
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Principle Three: 
Communications Policy 
Signatories should have and publicly 
disclose their policy (or policies) for 
communication with issuers, 
shareholder proponents, other 
stakeholders, media and the public. 
Guidance 
Introduction 
Signatories should explain their 
approach to communication with 
issuers, shareholder proponents, other 
stakeholders, media and the public. 
It is for signatories to choose whether 
or not to engage in dialogue and in 
what format. 
If signatories choose to have such a 
dialogue, it is up to them to determine 
the objectives, timing, frequency and 
format of this dialogue. 
Comments and statements in the press 
or public forums may have a significant 
impact and, as such, should be 
properly managed. 
Dialogue with Issuers, 
Shareholder Proponents & 
Other Stakeholders 
Signatories should have a policy (or 
policies) for dialogue with issuers, 
shareholder proponents, other 
stakeholders and their advisors. 
To the extent dialogue has taken place, 
signatories should communicate to 
clients in their research reports the 
nature of the dialogue, which may also 
include informing clients of the 
outcome of that dialogue. 
The policy should cover issues 
including, but not limited to: 
x The circumstances under which 
such dialogue could occur; 
x How signatories verify the 
information used in their 
analysis; 
x Whether and how issuers are 
provided with a mechanism to 
review research reports or data 
used to develop research 
reports prior to publication to 
clients; 
x Procedures for avoiding receipt 
of privileged, non-public 
information and, in cases where 
such information is received, 
procedures for managing such 
information; 
x If/how signatories 
communicate during the voting 
period (defined as the period 
from release of the agenda until 
the general meeting); 
x What steps are taken to protect 
signatories and their employees 
from undue pressure or 
retaliatory actions arising from 
the delivery of service 
Dialogue with Media & the 
Public 
Signatories reserve the right to 
respond to general media enquiries 
about the nature of their services and 
about the companies or issues they 
cover. However, signatories should 
have and disclose a policy (or policies) 
for communication with the media and 
the public. This policy should include, 
at minimum, the following 
considerations: 
x Which of the signatory’s 
employees are permitted to 
make comments to the media; 
and, 
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x The signatory’s policy toward 
the publication of public 
recommendations (if made) on 
any particular resolution prior 
to the publication of their 
reports to clients. Exceptions to 
this policy should be explained. 
It should be noted that signatories 
cannot be held responsible for the 
unauthorised use or re-use of their 
materials. 
At all times, signatories should observe 
applicable laws or regulations 
regarding libel, slander, market abuse, 
insider trading, distribution of material 
non-public information, etc. 
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Appendix I: 
Charter Signatories 
The BPPG and Charter Signatories of 
the Best Practice Principles for 
Shareholder Voting Research & 
Analysis Providers are: 
 
 
Glass, Lewis & Co. 
 
Institutional 
Shareholder 
Services Inc. 
 
IVOX GmbH 
 
Manifest 
Information 
Services Ltd 
 
PIRC Ltd 
 
Proxinvest 
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BPP Group Consultation 2 of 28 28 October 2013 
Part One: Executive Summary 
1.1 Introduction
In February 2012, upon conclusion of the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) 
consultation regarding the proxy advisory industry in Europe, an industry group formed to develop 
a set of Best Practice Principles for Governance Research Providers (“Principles”).  
The Principles (which, in draft form, are the subject of this consultation) are designed to govern, 
on a comply-or-explain basis: 
x The nature and character of governance research services;  
x The standards of conduct that underpin those services; and 
x How signatories to the Principles interact with other market participants.  
They are intended to complement applicable legislation, regulation and other soft-law 
instruments.
The Drafting Committee of the Principles (“Committee”) invites comments on all matters 
contained in this Consultation Document and, in particular, on the questions raised (a full list of 
questions can be found on page 25.)
1.2 Background to the Principles  
In March 2012, ESMA launched a consultation on the proxy advisory industry in Europe and the 
role of the industry in the shareholder voting process. In the ESMA Final Report and Feedback 
Statement on the Consultation Regarding the Role of the Proxy Advisory Industry (“ESMA Final 
Report”), published 19 February 2013, ESMA concluded that: 
“(I)t has not been provided with clear evidence of market failure in relation to how proxy 
advisors interact with investors and issuers. On this basis, ESMA currently considers that the 
introduction of binding measures would not be justified. However, based on its analysis and 
the inputs from market participants, ESMA considers that there are several areas, in particular 
relating to transparency and disclosure, where a coordinated effort of the proxy advisory 
industry would foster greater understanding and assurance among other stakeholders in 
terms of what these can rightfully expect from proxy advisors. Such understanding and 
assurance will help to keep attention focused where it belongs, namely on how investors and 
issuers can, from their respective roles foster effective stewardship and robust corporate 
governance, and ensure efficient markets. Consequently, ESMA considers that the 
appropriate approach to be taken at this point in time is to encourage the proxy advisory 
industry to develop its own Code of Conduct.1”
                                              
1 ESMA recommends EU Code of Conduct for proxy advisor industry: http://www.esma.europa.eu/content/ESMA-recommends-
EU-Code-Conduct-proxy-advisor-industry (page 3).
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In February 2013, the Committee, made up of the following governance research industry 
members, was formed: 
x Glass, Lewis & Co.
x Institutional Shareholder Services Inc.
x IVOX GmbH
x Manifest Information Services Ltd
x PIRC Ltd
x Proxinvest
The Committee is led by an independent chairman, Prof. Dr. Dirk Andreas Zetzsche, LL.M. 
(Toronto), who is a professor of law and holds the Propter Homines Chair for Banking and 
Securities Law at the University of Liechtenstein. He is also one of the directors of the Center for 
Business and Corporate Law at Heinrich Heine University in Düsseldorf.  
Prof. Zetzsche was selected by the Committee after a public call for interest and is independent 
from both the Committee and ESMA. Prof. Zetzsche has no industry affiliations but extensive 
practical and academic experience with both shareholder voting and institutional investments. 
ESMA provides Prof. Zetzsche with logistical support, including granting him a daily allowance of 
150 EUR for meetings attended and reimbursing his travel and accommodation costs in 
connection with meetings. Prof. Zetzsche undertook the role of Committee Chair because of his 
interest in shareholder stewardship and fostering transparency of the voting process. While the 
Chair fulfilled an advisory and coordinating function, he did not interfere with the fundamental 
decisions with regard to the Principles; these decisions were made exclusively by the industry 
members of the Committee. 
Once finalised, the Committee will monitor the impact of the Principles and will review them 
periodically in order to respond to ongoing feedback from stakeholders and developments that 
are relevant to the industry. While the Committee has yet to finalise the specifics of the monitoring 
and review process, the first review will take place in autumn 2014, after which a statement 
regarding any further developments to the Principles will be issued. The Committee expects to 
publish the details of the monitoring and review process as part of the launch of the Principles, 
taking into account feedback by all relevant stakeholders in the course of this consultation. 
A Committee member has volunteered to organise the creation and continued administration of 
an independent website that will serve as a central location for signatories to the Principles. (A 
copy of this consultation can be found at http://bppgrp.info.)
1.3 Aim & Scope of the Public Consultation 
In drawing up the Principles, the Committee took into account market feedback to the 2012 
ESMA consultation regarding the role of the proxy advisory industry, as well as the analysis and 
views of ESMA and the ESMA Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (“SMSG”) that were 
expressed in the ESMA Final Report. 
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To refine the Principles and finalise the process, the Committee is seeking feedback from 
potential signatories, institutional investors, issuers and other stakeholders on a variety of topics, 
including:
x Views on the way the Principles aim to improve communication with stakeholders and the 
public, and means to foster understanding about the way signatories operate and the 
services they provide; 
x Views on the proposed key Principles and related Guidance; and 
x Views on the governance of the Principles, the transparency of the process and possible 
further development of the initiative. 
1.4 How to Respond to the Consultation 
The following document features the Principles and related Guidance that were approved on a 
preliminary basis by Committee members on 18 October 2013.  
The Consultation questions to which respondents are invited to answer are presented after each 
section.
Whenever possible, responses to this consultation should contain specific examples and/or 
describe possible alternatives the Committee should consider. 
Responses should be sent via e-mail to consultation@bppgrp.info by noon (CET) 20 December 
2013. It would greatly help the analysis of responses if you could send both PDF and word 
processor versions of your responses to the consultation.
When providing feedback, please also describe your organisation (e.g. issuer, asset owner, asset 
manager, etc.) and background. 
If you do not wish your response to be made public, please let us know. All other responses will 
be made available at the Committee’s independent website: http://bppgrp.info.
The Committee intends to issue the final Principles in March 2014. Please see Appendix II: 
Consultation Timetable on page 28 for details. 
Part Two: The Best Practice Principles
1 Background 
The charter signatories (see Appendix 1) of the Best Practice Principles for Governance Research 
Providers (“Principles”) have prepared and adopted the following Principles in relation to activities 
associated with the provision of shareholder voting and analytical services. 
In addition to promoting the integrity and efficiency of processes and controls related to the provision of 
such services, the Principles are intended to foster greater understanding of the role of governance 
research providers in the voting decisions made by institutional investors (i.e., asset owners and fund 
managers).
The Principles were developed by the Drafting Committee (“Committee”), which participated in a series 
of meetings under the guidance and independent chairmanship of Prof. Dr. Dirk Andreas Zetzsche, 
LL.M. (Toronto), Propter Homines Chair for Banking and Securities Law, University of Liechtenstein 
(Principality of Liechtenstein), and Director of the Center for Business & Corporate Law, Faculty of Law, 
University of Duesseldorf (Germany). 
New signatories beyond the Committee are encouraged to adopt the Principles. 
In developing the Principles, signatories have drawn on a number of publicly available sources, 
including but not limited to: 
x ESMA Final Report and Feedback Statement on the Consultation Regarding the Role of the
Proxy Advisory Industry (19 February 2013)  
x Investor Codes
Æ AFG: Recommendations de l’Association Française de Gestion (FR) 
Æ BVI: Bundesverband Investment and Asset Management Rules of Good Conduct (DE) 
Æ Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (“CRISA”) (ZA) 
Æ EFAMA: European Fund and Asset Management Association Code for External 
Governance (EU) 
Æ Eumedion: Eumedion Best Practices for Engaged Ownership (NL) 
Æ FRC: The UK Stewardship Code (September 2012), published by the Financial 
Reporting Council (UK) 
Æ ICGN: International Corporate Governance Network Statement of Principles on 
Institutional Shareholder Responsibilities (Global) 
Æ Lignes Directrices pour les Investisseurs Institutionnels (Economiesuisse and other 
Swiss organizations) (CH) 
Æ OECD: Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development Principles of 
Corporate Governance (Global) 
Æ PRI: Principles for Responsible Investment (Global) 
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x Financial Markets Participants
Æ AMF : Recommendation No 2011-06 of 18 March 2011 in respect of proxy voting 
agencies issued by the Autorités des Marchés Financiers (FR) 
Æ CFA: Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct and Research Objectivity 
Standards (Global) 
Æ IIA: Institute of Internal Auditors’ International Standards for the Professional Practice of 
Internal Auditing (Standards) 1300 Series Regarding Quality Assurance and 
Improvement Programs (Global)
1.1 Comply or Explain 
Not all governance research providers offer the same services in the same way. For this reason, the 
Principles are constructed on a “comply-or-explain” framework. This will enable each signatory to 
explain how the Principles relate to their specific circumstances and business model. 
Regardless of a signatory’s business model, it is expected that explanations for deviation from the 
Principles and the related Guidance should be comprehensible, relevant and detailed. They should be 
substantiated and adapted to the signatory’s particular situation and should convincingly indicate why a 
specific aspect justifies an exemption. The explanations provided should state alternative measures 
that have been taken, if applicable. If a signatory intends to comply at a later stage with a measure from 
which it has provisionally deviated, it should state when this temporary situation will come to an end. 
1.2 Application of the Principles 
In the first instance, signatories to the Principles should publish a link to their Statement of Compliance 
with the Governance Research Principles (“Statement of Compliance”), via the Committee’s 
independent website http://bppgrp.info.
If they so choose, signatories may wish to issue their statements via other publicly accessible sources. 
For example, ESMA has agreed to maintain a voluntary list of signatories to the Principles on its 
website together with a link to the independent Best Practice Principles Group website. 
The Statement of Compliance should: 
x Describe in a meaningful way how signatories apply the Principles and related Guidance; 
x Disclose any specific information suggested in the supporting Guidance; and 
x Where any of the Principles have not been applied or relevant information has not been disclosed, 
provide a reasoned explanation as to why. 
Signatories are encouraged to review their Statement of Compliance from time to time (at least 
annually) and update it as appropriate to reflect current practice or material changes. 
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Consultation Questions - Background to The Principles 
In February 2013, the members of the Committee announced their support of ESMA’s 
recommendation to develop a set of best practice principles for the industry and launched a process 
for collaborating on the development of the Principles, with the administrative support of ESMA.
Since announcing the initiative, the Committee met in March (Milan), April (Paris), July (Frankfurt), 
August (London), September (via conference calls and in person in Paris) and in October (via 
conference calls and in person in London) and has scheduled a February session in Frankfurt to 
finalise the Principles in advance of the official launch scheduled for March in Brussels. 
In drafting the Principles, the Committee considered each of ESMA’s and the SMSG’s conclusions 
and suggestions in terms of content and practicability. Where conclusions and suggestions were 
inconsistent with actual industry practice, the Committee carefully reviewed alternatives in light of the 
two key rationales of the ESMA Final Report: enhance transparency and reduce the impact of 
conflicts of interest on stakeholders.  
In October, the Committee invited a number of additional potential signatories to a meeting in London 
for a discussion of a draft version of the Principles. The Consultation Document reflects feedback and 
suggestions made at the October meeting, if they were widely supported by the expanded group. 
(Feedback from the October meeting is not reflected in this version of the Principles and will be 
considered as part of the wider Consultation review.) The Committee acknowledges that certain 
provisions of the Principles were hotly debated among the Committee members and/or potential 
signatories.
1. What are your views about the Principles development process?  
2. Respondents are welcome to express their expectations regarding the review and monitoring 
of the Principles. As the ongoing governance of the Principles has yet to be determined, the 
Committee particularly welcomes suggestions by stakeholders as to how a representative 
feedback mechanism can be implemented. 
Consultation Questions -  Comply or Explain  
The Principles are intended to operate on a “comply-or-explain” basis. This approach is inspired by 
other successful best practice codes and is considered to be the best option to ensure the 
effectiveness of the Principles. 
3. Please share your views on the practicality of a comply-or-explain approach to the Principles. 
4. Could the effectiveness of the Principles be further enhanced? Please elaborate and provide 
specific examples and/or suggestions. 
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Consultation Questions  - Application of the Principles
The Committee recognises that potential signatories have different business models and approaches 
to service provision, i.e. they are not “One Size Fits All”. The comply-or-explain approach is therefore 
viewed as the most appropriate tool to enable the industry to enhance transparency and 
understanding of their individual approaches without imposing standards that may not be relevant to 
their given model. 
The form and substance of disclosures are fundamental to the effectiveness of the comply-or-explain 
model and will enhance the visibility of the initiative. To that end, signatories should publish their 
Statement of Compliance on the Committee’s independent website.
5. Do you believe the Principles and/or supporting Guidance conflict with obligations under 
legislation or other best practice principles? If yes, please elaborate and provide specific 
examples and/or suggestions. 
6. Please share your views on the procedures for registering as a signatory, describing and 
disclosing how Principles and related Guidance are being applied, and for disclosing the 
Statement of Compliance. 
7. What should the regional scope of the Principles be, in terms of signatories and services 
provided? For example, do you think that the Principles should be global? 
8. For additional potential signatories only: Are there factors that generally would keep you from 
becoming a signatory to the Principles? If yes, please elaborate and provide specific 
examples and/or suggestions. 
9. For additional potential signatories only: What are your views on the Guidance for 
subscription, adoption and ongoing compliance from an organisational point of view? Do you 
think the ongoing management of the Principles could be improved? If yes, please elaborate 
and provide specific examples and/or suggestions. 
BPP Group Consultation 9 of 28 28 October 2013 
2 Introduction to the Principles 
Investors have a number of important ownership rights, one of which is the right to vote at shareholder 
meetings. Voting is a key right of asset owners, whose effective discharge is a fiduciary responsibility. 
As with many other parts of the investment process, investors need access to information and 
administration tools that support them in the discharge of their responsibilities. 
Signatories provide a range of professional services designed to assist institutional investors in the 
discharge of their rights and responsibilities. The Principles set forth here govern signatories’ conduct in 
discharging their responsibilities toward clients. 
These Principles have been developed with the following considerations in mind: 
x The services are an efficient way of managing the logistical complexities associated with 
analysing and interpreting corporate disclosures, as well as ensuring and managing the 
operational aspects of shareholder voting; 
x Clients may use one or more services that support and complement their own in-house research 
activities; 
x Clients may, themselves, be subject to a variety of rules and regulations in relation to asset 
ownership and oversight; 
x Signatories’ underlying clients are responsible for their own compliance procedures; 
x Signatories operate within the framework provided by applicable law, including those governing 
company law, contract law and client confidentiality, as well as securities laws associated with 
market abuse and insider trading; and, 
x Nothing in these Principles is a substitute for adherence to relevant laws and market regulations. 
Irrespective of the type of services used to support ownership and voting activities, the ultimate 
responsibility to monitor investments and make voting decisions lies with institutional investors; use of 
third-party services (such as those provided by signatories) does not shift this responsibility, unless the 
third party assumes additional authorities from the client. 
Stakeholders wishing to understand how an institutional investor discharges its stewardship or 
ownership responsibilities should consult relevant disclosures of the organisation to understand its 
approach. 
2.1 Scope & Definitions 
To better understand the relevance and application of the Principles, it is important to understand the 
different types of services the signatories provide. 
The key objective of the signatories is to support institutional investors in the exercise of their ownership 
rights and responsibilities through the provision of value-added services. These services may include 
one or more of the following, which may or may not be provided on a commercial basis: 
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2.1.1 Governance Research Services 
Governance research services comprise services provided on a regular basis as an intellectual 
contribution to the company-specific, proxy vote-decision and engagement activities of institutional 
investors.
Governance research services can be varied and may exhibit one or more of the following 
characteristics: 
x Alerts, bulletins and newsletters 
x Company-specific advice/opinions 
x Data and analysis 
x Policy guidance 
x Ratings 
x Voting recommendations 
Depending on the services subscribed to, the services may yield different results for different clients. 
This is because governance and ownership policies and preferences will vary from organisation to 
organisation.
Unless otherwise stated or disclosed, in developing governance research services, signatories are not 
acting on behalf of a particular shareholder or group of shareholders that is trying to influence how other 
shareholders vote, nor are they acting on behalf of an issuer that is trying to secure votes from its 
shareholders.  
2.1.2 Additional Services 
In addition to governance research services, signatories may provide additional services, such as vote 
agency and/or engagement and governance overlay services. 
“Vote agency” is defined as the provision of proxy vote execution services, whereby the voting agent is 
responsible for some or all of the logistical and operational activities associated with transmitting 
instructions from the institutional investor to the company meeting, as well as record-keeping and 
reporting activities. Votes may be transmitted to the meeting directly (including personal attendance) or 
through a chain of operational intermediaries, depending on regulatory or market specificities in each 
relevant jurisdiction. 
“Engagement and governance overlay services” are defined as undertaking contact and engagement 
with issuers on behalf of investors with a view to asking the company in question to amend aspects of 
its governance.
Vote agency, engagement and governance overlay services providers often provide governance 
research services. Where this is the case, the provision of these Principles apply to the governance 
research services they offer, either on a standalone basis or in conjunction with other services.  
The particularities of vote agency and engagement services are not addressed by these Principles. 
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Consultation Questions – Scope & Definitions 
The scope of the governance research industry, and hence the list of potential signatories, can only 
be determined by a clear definition of the services provided to investors. In its feedback statement, 
ESMA does not provide such a definition. According to the SMSG, the Principles should apply to “all 
parties that engage on a professional basis in proxy advice”2
A review of the services provided by different members of the industry revealed a wide variety of 
types of services. In fact, some industry members do not provide “advice3” on how to exercise voting 
rights but rather provide governance research and guidance to help investors form their own voting 
decisions.
The Committee believes the distinction between the defining activities of “governance research” and 
other related governance services best reflects what (potential) signatories offer on a regular basis. 
This approach was taken in light of the SMSG’s clear distinction between agency services and “proxy 
advice”4.
The Principles relate only to the development and provision of “governance research services,” as 
defined in 2.1 on page 10. It is up to the individual service provider to determine if what it does 
qualifies as governance research and, as such, should be subject to the Principles. 
In addition to governance research services, signatories may provide additional services, such as 
vote agency services and/or engagement and governance overlay services. Those services are likely 
to be governed by additional legal requirements imposed by the company and securities laws of 
relevant markets, most of which are not fully harmonised. Since the Principles do not seek to override 
existing legislation, neither at the EU Member States’ or global markets’ level, the Principles are silent 
on these matters. The Committee and the Principles may evolve over time to encompass other such 
activities related to governance research.  
Given that the responsibility for the vote decision lies with the shareholder or its investment manager, 
the Committee has not included any Principles or Guidance that would impose standards of conduct 
on investors, for example any obligation on the part of investors to review governance research 
before voting. These requirements concern the investor’s duty of care or conduct of business as 
established by legislation governing institutional investors and as such are beyond the scope of these 
Principles.
10. Do you agree with the definition of “governance research services”? Is the scope of the 
definition adequate? If not, please elaborate and provide specific suggestions. 
11. Are the definitions of “vote agency services” and “engagement and governance overlay 
services” and their distinction from “governance research services” sufficiently clear and 
accurate? If not, please elaborate.  
12. Do you agree that the Principles should not impose standards of conduct on investors? If not, 
please explain why. 
                                              
2 See ESMA Final Report, p. 34.
3 The legal definition of “Advice” varies from market to market. Advice may be regarded by some as “telling” or directing clients what to 
do, others consider advice as “informing”. A Tilba and T McNulty, “Engaged versus disengaged ownership: the case of pension funds in 
the UK” (2013) 21(2) Corporate Governance: An International Review 165 at 173.
4 See ESMA Final Report, p. 30.
3 The Best Practice Principles 
Principle One: Service Quality 
Signatories aim to offer services that are delivered in accordance with agreed client specifications. 
Signatories should have and publicly disclose a research policy and, if applicable, “house” voting 
guidelines.
Principle Two: Conflicts Of Interest Management 
Signatories should have and publicly disclose a conflicts-of-interest policy that details their procedures 
for addressing potential or actual conflicts of interest that may arise in connection with the provisions of 
services.
Principle Three: Communications Policy 
Signatories should have and publicly disclose their policy (or policies) for communication with issuers, 
shareholder proponents, other stakeholders, media and the public. 
The Principles are, in turn, supported by Guidance that explains the background and relevance of the 
Principles.
Unless otherwise stated, all policies should be disclosed on the signatory’s website or made available 
on request. 
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Principle One: Service Quality 
Signatories aim to offer services that are delivered in accordance with agreed client specifications. 
Signatories should have and publicly disclose a research policy and, if applicable, “house” voting 
guidelines.
Guidance
Governance research and analysis should be relevant, accurate and reviewed by appropriate personnel 
prior to publication. Signatories should be able to demonstrate that their reports, analyses, guidance 
and/or recommendations are prepared to a standard that can be substantiated as reasonable and 
adequate.
Signatories should explain how they organise activities to ensure their research is developed in 
accordance with stated research policy, methodologies and, if applicable, voting guidelines; in addition, 
they should describe what reasonable efforts they make to ensure their research is independent and 
free from inappropriate bias or undue influence. 
Institutional investors may assess investee companies’ governance arrangements and make voting 
decisions based on their own view or “custom” voting policy. In this case, they may contract with a 
signatory to receive governance research based on their own voting guidelines. Alternatively, investors 
may subscribe to governance research services developed based on a signatory’s proprietary or 
“house” voting guidelines and subsequently decide on the extent to which they incorporate that 
research in their own assessment and decisions.
Responsibilities to Clients 
A signatory’s primary responsibility is to provide services to clients in accordance with agreed 
specifications. 
Research Policy 
Signatories should have and disclose a written research policy that outlines: 
x The general approach that leads to the generation of research; 
x The extent to which local conditions and customs are taken into account; 
x The extent to which custom or house voting guidelines may be applied; and 
x The systems and controls they deploy to reasonably ensure the reliability of the use of 
information in the research process, and the limitations thereof. 
A signatory’s research policy does not need to disclose any information which could harm the 
signatory’s legitimate business interests, including, but not limited to, intellectual property. 
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Voting Guidelines 
Signatories may elect to provide governance research services that are developed based on a set of 
house voting guidelines. The voting guidelines typically provide a reference framework against which to 
assess governance arrangements and general meeting resolutions. 
Signatories should disclose whether they have developed house voting guidelines. If so, they should 
disclose the guidelines, including, but not limited to, the extent to which local guidelines and standards 
are used (if at all). 
Each signatory will have its own approach to house voting guideline development and review, which 
may include one or more of the following approaches: 
x Client review x Academic literature review 
x Public consultations x Guideline exposure drafts 
x One-on-one/face-to-face discussions x Group discussions/webinars 
x Expert/regulatory body reports x Discussion at industry conferences 
Signatories should explain how their voting guidelines are developed and whether and how they 
incorporate feedback into the voting guidelines development process. 
Signatories are not responsible for disclosing client research policies or voting guidelines and may have 
contractual obligations that preclude them from discussing any aspect of their client relationships, 
voting guidelines or intentions. 
Research Methodologies 
In addition to a research policy and house voting guidelines, signatories may also develop research 
methodologies. Research methodologies provide a detailed framework on how to assess governance 
arrangements and general meeting resolutions in each specific instance. 
Signatories should make their research methodologies available to clients. In making such disclosure, 
research methodologies do not need to contain information which could harm the signatory’s legitimate 
business interests, including, but not limited to, intellectual property. 
Quality of Research 
Signatories should have systems and controls in place to reasonably ensure the reliability of the 
information used in the research process to the extent possible, bearing in mind they cannot be 
responsible for disclosures published by issuers or shareholder resolution proponents that are the 
subject of their research. 
Signatories should maintain records of the sources of data used for the provision of services to clients 
(to the extent legally or contractually possible). 
Signatories should, where this is proportionate to their size, implement organisational features to 
achieve adequate verification or double-checking of the quality of research that is provided. These may 
include:
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x Four-eyes principle (i.e. reports must be checked by a person independent of the research 
process itself) 
x Issuer fact-checking 
x IT-based consistency check 
x Review by governance committee 
x Review by senior analyst 
x Review by senior management and/or executives 
Signatories should be transparent regarding the research information provided to clients, including, 
when applicable, dialogue with issuers or shareholder proponents (see Principle 3). To that end, 
signatories should make reasonable efforts to ensure that use, inclusion or reproduction of external 
private, copyright-protected information be duly referenced, so clients can assess to what degree third-
party input plays a role in the services they use.
Employee Qualification & Training 
Employee qualifications include desired requirements for education, skills, competence and experience. 
Signatories should make reasonable efforts to ensure staff are trained on the relevance and importance 
of their activities and on how they contribute to service delivery. 
Where a signatory outsources any process that could affect service quality, the signatory should 
exercise control over such processes. The type and extent of control applied to these outsourced 
processes should be clearly explained. 
Timeliness
Signatories have a responsibility to provide clients with adequate and timely services, subject to the 
timely availability of source information from issuers and shareholder resolution proponents, as well as 
intermediary constraints (for example, vote deadlines and intermediary cut-offs). Signatories should 
make reasonable efforts to use the most up-to-date information available when developing research and 
vote guidance. 
Complaints & Feedback Management 
Signatories should have and disclose their policies for managing and responding to complaints, 
comments or feedback about their services. 
Client & Supplier Understanding 
The operational aspects of service delivery will generally form the basis of the service agreement 
between signatories and their clients. 
Signatories should notify clients of the scope of the services provided, as well as any known or potential 
limitations or conditions that should be taken into account in the use of signatory services. 
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Limitations may include:
x Data availability issues, as not all markets require the same level of detail in disclosure; 
x Missing, inaccurate or incomplete documents or disclosures, such as from issuers or 
shareholder proponents; 
x Reliance on third parties that are beyond the control of the signatory; and, 
x Inconsistencies and irregularities of information provided by intermediaries in the ownership 
chain, such as agenda information, vote deadlines, blocking procedures, etc. 
Signatories should provide clients with a framework that enables them to fulfil their due-diligence 
requirements. The framework could include the following: 
x Site visits; 
x Interaction with research teams; 
x Information on quality controls that govern the research development process; 
x Information on the qualifications and experience of the signatory’s staff; and, 
x Information on how the research policy has been or will be applied and on which assumptions 
the research output has been based. 
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Consultation Questions - Principle One 
Principle One aims to explain the quality of services provided by signatories. It underlines the primary 
importance of loyalty and transparency toward clients. In compliance with this principle, signatories 
will prepare and disclose a written policy that outlines their general approach to their research.
Principle One also calls for the disclosure of research policies, voting guidelines and research 
methodologies, which will enable stakeholders to understand how signatories develop the services 
they offer. In drafting Principle One, a balance was sought between ensuring transparency on the 
research policy, voting guidelines and research methodologies and protecting the legitimate business 
interests of signatories and their clients. 
13. Do you think that Principle One will help the market to better understand the different kinds of 
services and approaches that participants operate? If not, please explain. 
14. Do you see any issues of service quality that are not addressed in this section? If so, please 
provide examples and specific information on the purpose and merits of any additional 
disclosures.
15. Do you think the disclosure of the research policy, voting guidelines and research 
methodologies will enable stakeholders to determine how signatories consider local market 
conditions? If not, please provide reasons. 
16. Please express your views on the scope and content of the proposed research-related 
disclosure under this principle with respect, to: 
a. research policy 
b. voting guidelines 
c. research methodologies 
17. For additional potential signatories only: Does the Guidance provide you with the information 
necessary to properly apply Principle One? If not, would you prefer further Guidance? Please 
explain. 
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Principle Two: Conflicts of Interest Management 
Signatories should have and publicly disclose a conflicts-of-interest policy that details their procedures 
for addressing potential or actual conflicts of interest that may arise in connection with the provisions of 
services.
Guidance
The possibility for conflicts of interest can arise in all businesses. While conflicts cannot always be 
eliminated, they can be managed and mitigated. The overriding objective of this principle is to 
reasonably ensure that research and business conduct are independent, fair, clear, not misleading and 
free from possible bias or undue influence. With this in mind, signatories should make full and timely 
disclosure of potential conflicts that could reasonably be expected to impair their independence or 
interfere with their duty to clients. 
Possible Conflicts for Consideration 
Signatories should consider how the following non-exhaustive list of potential conflicts may materially 
impact their operations and how these potential conflicts may be addressed:
x A signatory’s ownership or shareholder base/structure, such as when a signatory is owned by 
an investor that owns shares in companies under coverage or when the investor is owned by an 
issuer under coverage; 
x A signatory’s employee activities, such as board memberships, stock ownership, etc.; 
x Investor-Client influence on the signatories, such as when an investor who is a client of the 
service provider is a shareholder proposal proponent or is a dissident shareholder in a proxy 
contest; and, 
x Issuer-Client influence on the signatories, such as when signatories provide consulting services 
to companies under coverage for research. 
Conflicts of Interest Policy 
Signatories should have and disclose a conflicts-of-interest policy that explains: 
x How and when potential material conflicts will be disclosed to clients (for example on a website, 
contained within research reports, email bulletins, etc.); 
x How signatories communicate their conflicts-of-interest policy and train employees in the 
operation of that policy; and,
x How conflicts will be managed. 
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Conflict Management & Mitigation 
Conflict management and mitigation procedures may include one or more of the following approaches: 
x Code of ethics 
x Division of labour 
x Employee recusal 
x Fire walls/IT systems and controls 
x Independent oversight committees 
x Information barriers and ring-fencing 
x Physical employee separation 
x Separate reporting streams 
x Transparent policies and procedures 
Conflict Disclosure 
If a signatory becomes aware of a conflict of interest that cannot be effectively managed, the signatory 
should:
x Disclose the conflict to the relevant client(s) without undue delay before or at the same time the 
service is delivered; and, 
x Manage the conflict as further detailed in the signatory’s conflicts of interest policy. 
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Consultation Questions -  Principle Two 
Principle Two calls for specific disclosure to clients of all potential and actual conflicts of interest, as 
well as disclosure of the specific measures taken to manage potential and/or actual conflicts. Where 
a conflict is unavoidable, signatories maintain policies and procedures for their proper management.
The Committee considers that a written, publicly available conflicts-of-interest policy is the right 
instrument to ensure the independence and integrity of the service. The Guidance for this principle 
provides examples of conflicts, conflict-management and mitigation procedures, and conflict-
disclosure procedures. (The list of examples provided is not considered exhaustive.) 
Although the policy should be made public, it does not require public disclosure of specific conflicts, 
as such disclosures could conflict with information barriers put in place by a signatory to prevent a 
potential conflict from becoming an actual conflict. For example, some signatories may have 
established information barriers to prevent their research staff from being influenced by the 
provider’s relationships or potential relationships with an issuer subject to their analysis and to 
guarantee an unimpaired judgment by the research staff. Therefore, each signatory may decide on 
a case-by-case basis whether disclosure of the conflict to the public is appropriate. Signatories 
should, however, disclose all potential and actual conflicts to their clients. 
The Guidance to Principle Two follows established regulatory or professional models, i.e. a 
standard of integrity that is comparable to what any regulation would achieve notwithstanding the 
fact that signatories serve institutional investor clients on a confidential basis.
18. Does Principle Two address the relevant issues or considerations relating to potential 
conflicts of interest in the provision of governance research? If not, please explain.
19. Do you agree with the proposed conflict management and mitigation procedures? If not, 
please explain why and what additional measures you would propose. 
20. Do you agree with the proposed approach on disclosure of material conflicts? If not, please 
explain. 
21. For potential additional signatories only: Does the Guidance provide you the information 
necessary to properly apply Principle Two? If not, what additional Guidance do you need?
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Principle Three: Communications Policy 
Signatories should have and publicly disclose their policy (or policies) for communication with issuers, 
shareholder proponents, other stakeholders, media and the public. 
Guidance
Signatories should explain their approach to communications with issuers, shareholder proponents, 
other stakeholders, media and the public. 
It is for signatories to choose whether or not to engage in dialogue and in what format. If signatories 
choose to have such a dialogue, it is up to them to determine the objectives, timing, frequency and 
format of this dialogue. 
Comments and statements in the press or public forums may have a significant impact and, as such, 
should be properly managed. 
Dialogue with Issuers, Shareholder Proponents & Other Stakeholders 
Signatories should have a policy (or policies) for dialogue with issuers, shareholder proponents, other 
stakeholders and their advisors.
The policy should cover issues including, but not limited to: 
x The circumstances under which such dialogue could occur; 
x How signatories verify the information used in their analysis; 
x Whether and how issuers are provided with a mechanism to review research reports or data 
used to develop research reports prior to publication to clients; 
x Procedures for avoiding receipt of privileged, non-public information and, in cases where such 
information is received, procedures for managing such information; 
x If/how signatories communicate during the voting period (defined as the period from release of 
the agenda until the general meeting); 
x When and how signatories communicate to clients the nature of any dialogue with issuers, 
shareholder proponents or other stakeholders regarding voting issues under review; and, 
x What steps are taken to protect signatories and their employees from undue pressure or 
retaliatory actions arising from the delivery of their services. 
Dialogue with Media & the Public
Signatories reserve the right to respond to general media enquiries about the nature of their services 
and about the companies or issues they cover. However, signatories should have and disclose a policy 
(or policies) for communication with the media and the public. This policy should include, at minimum, 
the following considerations: 
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x Which of the signatory’s employees are permitted to make comments to the media and/or make 
public appearances; and, 
x The signatory’s policy toward the publication of public recommendations (if made) on any 
particular resolution prior to the publication of their reports to clients. Exceptions to this policy 
should be explained. 
It should be noted that signatories cannot be held responsible for the unauthorised use or re-use of 
their materials. 
At all times, signatories observe applicable laws or regulations regarding libel, slander, market abuse, 
insider trading, distribution of material non-public information, etc. 
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Consultation Questions -  Principle Three 
Principle Three does not dictate whether or not signatories should engage in dialogue with issuers 
and/or shareholder proponents. This approach was taken because some founding signatories engage 
on a routine basis, while others enter into dialogue only on a case-by-case basis or for further 
information gathering as part of their research process. In order to safeguard proper management of 
these interactions, signatories should disclose and explain their approach in a communications policy 
that is publicly accessible and can be reviewed by clients, issuers, shareholder proponents and other 
stakeholders.
The Committee also seeks to achieve greater transparency with regard to signatories’ media relations 
and to foster greater understanding and assurance among other stakeholders in terms of what they 
can rightfully expect from governance research providers. In order to achieve a balance between the 
stakeholders’ interest in transparency and the legitimate interests of signatories and their clients, a 
written policy that is publicly accessible should set forth the framework for interaction with media and 
the public. 
22. Please express your views on the scope and content of the proposed policy disclosure under 
this principle with respect to: 
a. Issuers 
b. Media and the public 
23. Are there any other aspects of issuer-related dialogue that should be taken into account?
If yes, please elaborate and provide specific examples and/or suggestions. 
24. Are there any other aspects of media and the public dialogue that should take into account? 
If yes, please elaborate and provide specific examples and/or suggestions. 
25. For additional potential signatories only: Does the Guidance provide you with the information 
you need to properly apply Principle Three? If not, where would you prefer further Guidance? 
Consultation Questions - General Features of The Principles 
26. In addition to comments on the specific questions addressed in the remainder of this 
Consultation Document, views are invited on the general approach taken by the Committee 
and the general features of the Principles.
27. Do you feel that the Principles meet the policy principles set forth in ESMA’s Final Report? If 
not please explain. 
28. Do you have any other comments that the Committee should take into account when finalising 
the Principles? 
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4 Summary of Consultation Questions 
1. What are your views about the principles development process?  
2. Respondents are welcome to express their expectations regarding the review and 
monitoring of the principles. As the on-going governance of the principles has yet to be 
determined, the committee particularly welcomes suggestions by stakeholders as to how a 
representative feedback mechanism can be implemented. 
3. Please share your views on the practicality of a comply-or-explain approach to the 
principles.
4. Could the effectiveness of the principles be further enhanced? Please elaborate and provide 
specific examples and/or suggestions. 
5. Do you believe the Principles and/or supporting Guidance conflict with obligations under 
legislation or other best practice principles? If yes, please elaborate and provide specific 
examples and/or suggestions. 
6. Please share your views on the procedures for registering as a signatory, describing and 
disclosing how Principles and related Guidance are being applied, and for disclosing the 
Statement of Compliance. 
7. What should the regional scope of the Principles be, in terms of signatories and services 
provided? For example, do you think that the Principles should be global? 
8. For additional potential signatories only: Are there factors that generally would keep you 
from becoming a signatory to the Principles? If yes, please elaborate and provide specific 
examples and/or suggestions. 
9. For additional potential signatories only: What are your views on the Guidance for 
subscription, adoption and ongoing compliance from an organisational point of view? Do you 
think the ongoing management of the Principles could be improved? If yes, please elaborate 
and provide specific examples and/or suggestions.Do you think that principle one will help 
the market to better understand the different kinds of services and approaches that 
participants operate? If not, please explain. 
10. Do you agree with the definition of “governance research services”? Is the scope of the 
definition adequate? If not, please elaborate and provide specific suggestions. 
11. Are the definitions of “vote agency services” and “engagement and governance overlay 
services” and their distinction from “governance research services” sufficiently clear and 
accurate? If not, please elaborate.  
12. Do you agree that the Principles should not impose standards of conduct on investors? If 
not, please explain why. 
13. Do you think that Principle One will help the market to better understand the different kinds 
of services and approaches that participants operate? If not, please explain. 
14. Do you see any issues of service quality that are not addressed in this section? If so, please 
provide examples and specific information on the purpose and merits of any additional 
disclosures.
15. Do you think the disclosure of the research policy, voting guidelines and research 
methodologies will enable stakeholders to determine how signatories consider local market 
conditions? If not, please provide reasons. 
16. Please express your views on the scope and content of the proposed research-related 
disclosure under this principle with respect, to: 
a. research policy 
b. voting guidelines 
c. research methodologies 
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17. For additional potential signatories only: Does the Guidance provide you with the information 
necessary to properly apply Principle One? If not, would you prefer further Guidance? 
Please explain. 
18. Does Principle Two address the relevant issues or considerations relating to potential 
conflicts of interest in the provision of governance research? If not, please explain.
19. Do you agree with the proposed conflict management and mitigation procedures? If not, 
please explain why and what additional measures you would propose. 
20. Do you agree with the proposed approach on disclosure of material conflicts? If not, please 
explain. 
21. For potential additional signatories only: Does the Guidance provide you the information 
necessary to properly apply Principle Two? If not, what additional Guidance do you need? 
22. Please express your views on the scope and content of the proposed policy disclosure 
under this principle with respect to: 
a. Issuers; and 
b. Media and the public 
23. Are there any other aspects of issuer-related dialogue that should be taken into account?
If yes, please elaborate and provide specific examples and/or suggestions. 
24. Are there any other aspects of media and the public dialogue that should take into account? 
If yes, please elaborate and provide specific examples and/or suggestions. 
25. For additional potential signatories only: Does the Guidance provide you with the information 
you need to properly apply Principle Three? If not, where would you prefer further 
Guidance?
26. In addition to comments on the specific questions addressed in the remainder of this 
Consultation Document, views are invited on the general approach taken by the Committee 
and the general features of the Principles.
27. Do you feel that the Principles meet the policy principles set forth in ESMA’s Final Report? If 
not please explain. 
28. Do you have any other comments that the Committee should take into account when 
finalising the Principles? 
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Appendix I: Charter Signatories 
Charter Signatories of the Drafting Committee of the Best Practice Principles for Governance Research 
Providers
x Glass, Lewis & Co.
x Institutional Shareholder Services Inc.
x IVOX GmbH
x Manifest Information Services Ltd
x PIRC Ltd
x Proxinvest
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Appendix II: Consultation Timetable 
Monday 28 October 2013 Launch of public consultation 
Friday 20 December 2013 Close of public consultation at 12.00 CET 
Thursday-Friday 6-7 February 2014 Review of draft Principles in light of consultation responses. 
28 February/early March 2014 Ratification and Adoption of final Principles by Drafting 
Committee
Publication of Principles 
September/October 2014 Committee meets for first review of Principles 
Report of the 
Chairman Annex III
Feedback Summary on the 
Consultation  
 
1 Feedback Summary 
 
Feedback Summary  
Results of Public Consultation on Best Practice Principles for Governance 
Research Providers1
30 April 2014 
I. Introduction 
Forty-six entities responded to the Principles 28 October 2013 consultation2,
including:
x 17 institutional investors and investor associations; 
x 17 issuer associations;  
x Nine service providers; and, 
x Three other stakeholders (such as corporate interest groups, investor relation 
associations, investment services and private individuals). 
The respondent group included 20 respondents from the UK; four each from the 
United States, Germany and the Netherlands;  three each from France and Belgium; 
and further responses from other European and global entities. 
II. Background to The Principles  
1. Development Process  
Question 1 What are your views about the Principles development process? 
One investor association remarked that the development of the Principles is a task 
for the industry. Correspondingly, one service provider and one other stakeholder 
agreed with the Drafting Committee’s composition (six industry members and an 
independent chairman), as it reflects the industry and thus ensures a balanced 
approach.  
                                                          
1 Now „Best Practice Principles for Shareholder Voting Research & Analysis“
2 The consultation document is available at http://bppgrp.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/BPP-Group-Principles-
Consultation.pdf.
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Two investor associations and one issuer association questioned whether the 
Drafting Committee’s current composition represents all relevant stakeholders or 
whether other perspectives should have been taken into account. One respondent 
said they would welcome further information on the formation of the Drafting 
Committee and selection of its members. 
Four investor associations and four issuer associations said they thought a wider 
stakeholder group should have been included in the drafting process or consulted at 
an earlier stage. One issuer association said that having governance research 
providers (“GRPs”) draft their own Principles presents a conflict of interest. 
Respondents from both investor and issuer groups recommended that a wider 
stakeholder group -- including shareholders, regulators, issuers and governance 
advisory services -- should be included in future refinement of the Principles. While 
most of those calling for the involvement of a wider stakeholder group were referring 
to the review and monitoring process of the Principles following their launch (see 
below), one investor association proposed that the inaugural Principles should be 
finalised by an independent committee. 
2. Review and Monitoring  
Question 2 Respondents are welcome to express their expectations regarding 
the review and monitoring of the Principles. As the on-going governance of the 
Principles has yet to be determined, the committee particularly welcomes 
suggestions by stakeholders as to how a representative feedback mechanism 
can be implemented. 
1.1. Review of the Principles 
1.1.1. Review body 
Nine investor group respondents and three issuer associations recommended the 
creation of a review body with independent members or stakeholder representatives. 
One service provider expressed the same view, citing as examples the UK Financial 
Reporting Council, which monitors the UK Stewardship Code, and the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee that reviews whether Dutch 
 
3 Feedback Summary 
 
listed companies and institutional investors comply with the Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code. 
1.1.2. Involvement of Stakeholders  
Eight investor group respondents, six issuer associations, four service providers and 
one other respondent recommended a review process that takes into account 
stakeholder feedback. While some respondents would include all relevant 
stakeholders, others emphasised the involvement of signatories and investor clients. 
With respect to feedback mechanisms, respondents suggested the use of 
consultations and ongoing feedback instruments, such as a comment system on the 
Best Practice Principles Group (the “Committee”) website or meetings with 
stakeholders. 
1.1.3. Timetable 
Most respondents did not comment on the proposed review timetable. While some 
prefer an ongoing review, other respondents said there should be periodic reviews. 
The proposed timing of the periodic reviews ranged from annually to every five years. 
One institutional investor said the initial review should occur after the first round of 
disclosures. One issuer association said the first review should occur sooner. 
1.2. Monitoring of the implementation by Signatories 
Respondents generally highlighted the importance of properly monitoring the 
effectiveness of the Principles’ implementation. Two institutional investors and one 
issuer association said they would like more information regarding the monitoring 
process and its results, in particular the consequences of non-compliance with the 
Principles or disclosed policies.  
1.2.1. Oversight Body 
Six investor group respondents, one service provider and five issuer associations 
advocated for an independent oversight body to monitor the implementation of the 
Principles. Other respondents highlighted the importance of a transparent monitoring 
process and said the process should be conducted by signatories’ investor clients,
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the signatories themselves and other stakeholders (see below). One investor 
association and one issuer association said the monitoring body could also be an 
independent organisation, such as ESMA, or could work under the auspices of 
ESMA. 
One service provider recommended the creation of a feedback mechanism on the 
Committee website (where signatories will post their Statements of Compliance) that 
would facilitate commenting on the implementation of the Principles. Other 
respondents recommended that the monitoring board should have a global remit and 
not focus solely on compliance as it relates to activities in the European market. In 
addition, they said the monitoring body should also be responsible for making 
recommendations to improve the quality of the Principles.  
1.2.2. Involvement of Stakeholders  
Four investor associations and one issuer association referred, in particular, to the 
relationship between GRPs and their investor clients. These respondents said GRP 
investor clients should monitor the implementation of the Principles by signatories, 
consider explanations and engage with GRPs, in particular with regard to 
explanations for non-compliance with the Principles or related Guidance. However, 
respondents also emphasized that other stakeholders should be able to contribute to 
the monitoring process. This was recommended by four investor group respondents, 
one service provider and one issuer association. Respondents suggested a comment 
system or forum for stakeholders (GRP investor clients, investors and issuers) that 
enable them to provide ongoing feedback on their experience with compliance with 
the Principles.  
1.2.3. Report on the monitoring process 
Respondents generally favour a transparent monitoring process. Correspondingly 
three investor associations, two service providers and two issuer associations 
recommended a public report on the monitoring process. 
One investor association said the monitoring report could feature a list of the 
signatories and the extent to which the services they provide are in line with their 
Statements of Compliance. One issuer association said signatories that deviate from 
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best practice without giving sufficient explanation should be identified (“name-and-
shame principle”).
III. Comply or Explain 
2. Comply or Explain  
Question 3 Please share your views on the practicality of a comply-or-explain 
approach to the Principles. 
Twelve investor group respondents, 12 issuer associations, six service providers and 
one other stakeholder expressed their general support for the comply-or-explain 
approach. Reasons provided for support of the comply-or-explain model include: 
x GRP investor clients have the primary responsibility for holding GRPs 
accountable; 
x The comply-or-explain approach provides more flexibility; 
x The variety of contrasting business models of GRPs; and, 
x Comply or explain provides more transparency for clients. 
Issuers that generally objected to this approach (three respondents) said: 
x The comply-or-explain approach is not appropriate because, in this specific 
area, a level of flexibility comparable to corporate governance codes is not 
necessary, as the aim is to implement a basic standard for the industry; and, 
x Because of the current high-level design of the Principles, the comply-or-
explain model would not yield meaningful results, as GRPs can easily deviate 
from the intention of the very general Principles without having to explain. 
3. Effectiveness of the Principles  
Question 4 Could the effectiveness of the Principles be further enhanced? 
Please elaborate and provide specific examples and/or suggestions 
Two issuers that generally agree with the approach set forth by the Principles said 
registration as a signatory and/or the submission of a Statement of Compliance 
should be mandatory for all qualified firms.
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Three investor group respondents and three issuer associations expressed confusion 
regarding the implementation of the comply-or-explain regime, in particular whether it 
would apply to both the Principles and the Guidance or just the Principles. 
While one investor association said it supported the broad, high-level Principles and 
the plan for signatories to give substance to those Principles, other respondents 
criticized the Principles for not being directive enough. 
x Five investor group respondents said the Principles are too high level. Six 
issuer associations and two service providers also expressed this view.  
x Six investor group respondents said they would like more clear -- and specific 
– best-practice standards for GRPs to which GRPs should comply with or 
explain why they don’t. Similar criticism was voiced by eight issuer 
associations and two service providers. 
Some respondents repeatedly said that some or all of the Guidance should become 
Principles, and thus be subject to the comply-or-explain regime. Also, they said the 
Principles should set a higher standard than what is contained in the draft version 
and that signatories should not be allowed to deviate from very general Principles.  
Two issuer associations said that improving transparency of GRP behaviour is not 
sufficient. They said the Principles should include best-practice provisions that 
promote dialogue with issuers and “the adoption of policies and organizational 
structures that mitigate conflicts.”
IV. Application of the Principles3
4. Conflict With Legislation or Soft Law Instruments  
Question 5 Do you believe the Principles and/or supporting Guidance conflict 
with obligations under legislation or other best practice Principles? If yes, 
please elaborate and provide specific examples and/or suggestions. 
                                                          
3 There were little or no responses to Question 9, provided feedback has been implemented in other report 
sections. 
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A majority of those who provided feedback on this question – both investor group 
respondents (eight) and issuer group respondents (three) – said they do not think the 
Principles and Guidance contain direction that conflicts with obligations under other 
best practice principles or existing legislation. One service provider concurred.  
4.1. Shareholders’ Right Directive
However, three respondents recommended that the 2014 Shareholders’ Right 
Directive revision be taken into account, as “proxy advisors” have been named as 
one area of possible future regulation. 
4.2. UK Stewardship Code 
Respondents said sections that address the responsibility of shareholders should not 
deviate from the UK Stewardship Code4 and expressed particular concern regarding 
the statement that “use of third-party services (such as those provided by signatories) 
does not shift this responsibility, unless the third party assumes additional authorities 
from the client.”
Two issuer associations said the term “investor” was not appropriate to describe the 
users of GRP services. They said the term “shareholder” is more appropriate 
because “registered shareholders” have the right to vote proxies under UK law. 
One investor association and one service provider said compliance with the 
Principles will result in a replication of requirements if, due to the alleged broad scope 
of the Principles, signatories also are subject to the UK Stewardship Code. Another 
stakeholder said that if GRPs are also signatories to the UK Stewardship Code, 
reporting against the Principles wouldn’t alone be sufficient to demonstrate 
compliance with the UK Stewardship Code. 
5. Procedural Aspects  
Question 6 Please share your views on the procedures for registering as a 
signatory, describing and disclosing how Principles and related Guidance are 
being applied, and for disclosing the Statement of Compliance.  
                                                          
4 One respondent named the relevant section of the UK Stewardship Code: “Institutional investors may choose to 
outsource to external service providers some of the activities associated with stewardship. However, they cannot 
delegate their responsibility for stewardship,” see https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-
bdc7-d540923533a6/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.aspx, on p. 2. 
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5.1. Registering 
One investor association and one service provider said they agree with the 
registration and disclosure procedures outlined in the Principles. One institutional 
investor, however, recommended a separate process for registering as a signatory 
prior to the signatory publishing its Statement of Compliance. One issuer association 
said the list of signatories should be operated by ESMA and accessible to 
stakeholders. 
5.2. Statement of Compliance 
Both investor and issuer group respondents highlighted the importance of meaningful 
disclosures and reasoned explanations in case of non-compliance with the Principles. 
One investor association and two issuer associations said Statements of Compliance 
should feature – either within the Statement or as an addendum – the content that, 
according to the Guidance, should be disclosed by signatories, in particular 
signatories’ research policies. 
Other respondents called for: 
x More explicit reporting obligations;  
x More detail in the Guidance regarding what constitutes an appropriate 
explanation for non-compliance; and, 
x The inclusion in the Statement of Compliance of a statement regarding the 
compliance with applicable national instruments, such as the recommendation 
regarding proxy advisor activities issued in 2011 by French regulator Autorité 
des Marchés Financiers (AMF).  
5.3. Disclosure 
Respondents of all groups endorsed the issuance by signatories of a Statement of 
Compliance. Suggestions regarding the means of disclosure fell into two groups:  
x Four investor group respondents, one service provider and one issuer 
association said they would like signatories to publish their Statements of 
Compliance and any related documents in a central location, such as the 
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Committee and ESMA websites, in order to simplify access and review by 
stakeholders. 
x One institutional investor and three issuer associations said signatories should 
(also) make the information available via their own public websites. 
One institutional investor and one issuer association recommended that signatories 
be expected to proactively deliver their statements to existing clients.  
5.4. Update 
One institutional investor recommended that signatories update and disclose 
Statements of Compliance annually or more frequently in the event of material 
changes, such as a change of ownership or changes related to conflicts of interest. 
Similarly three issuer associations recommended annual disclosure and review. 
6. Regional Scope  
Question 7 What should the regional scope of the Principles be, in terms of 
signatories and services provided? For example, do you think that the 
Principles should be global?  
Thirteen investor group respondents said the Principles should be applied globally. 
However, five of the 13 said the Principles should be developed and tested on the 
European level before extending the scope. Another stakeholder said the Principles 
should be harmonised with upcoming non-EU Principles or provisions (United States, 
Canada and Australia) once they are in place, rather than extending the scope now. 
One service provider expressed explicit support for a global scope of the Principles. 
Two other service providers endorsed a global scope in general but expressed 
reservations. One said that extending the scope at this stage could delay the 
implementation process, while the other said that expanding the scope globally could 
result in homogenization of guidelines, which the respondent said should be country 
specific. Another service provider said the Principles should be designed for the EU 
but said Guidance should encourage signatories to explain how the Principles apply 
– or not, due to “potential geographical challenges” – to other regions.  
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Four issuer associations endorsed applying the Principles globally. Two issuer 
associations said the Principles should only be applied to GRPs that provide services 
on Europe-listed companies. Three issuer associations said the Principles should 
ensure international consistency while remaining flexible enough to allow for national 
differences. 
The reasons provided in support of a global application of the Principles include:  
x The global nature of the services provided, companies covered and the client 
base; 
x The need for a level playing field for GRPs and equivalent client protection; 
x Concern that multiple codes would be counterproductive and would lead to 
confusion for clients and difficulties for signatories; 
x The similarity between the concerns being addressed by the Principles and 
those raised in other jurisdictions (United States and Canada); and, 
x The ability to apply the Principles to other jurisdictions because of their high-
level nature and non-binding character. 
7. Possible Barriers for Signatories 
Question 8 For additional potential signatories only: Are there factors that 
generally would keep you from becoming a signatory to the Principles? If yes, 
please elaborate and provide specific examples and/or suggestions.  
One possible barrier cited by a service provider is the limited resources, infrastructure 
and coverage of some signatories, which could inhibit their ability to employ 
sophisticated checking procedures, IT platforms and third-party experts. This 
respondent said the Principles should “foster the development of locally-based expert 
providers that guarantee the highest level of knowledge of local practices, a quick 
engagement with all involved parties and a direct involvement in all specific market-
related issues.”
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V. Scope & Definitions  
8. General Remarks on the Scope 
Three investor group respondents expressed agreement with the scope of the 
Principles. However, one of them said the wide scope could cause confusion and 
suggested that signatories should separate each provided service into the relevant 
components and explain compliance with the Principles with respect to each 
component. 
One service provider expressed agreement with the broad definition of firms to which 
the Principles should be applied and emphasized that the Principles should reflect 
the variety of GRP business models and should not be focused solely on the 
business practices of major market players. 
However, eight investor group respondents and three service providers criticised the 
extension of the scope beyond firms that provide vote recommendations and proxy 
research. The main criticism voiced by those respondents is that the broader scope 
could encompass other market participants that are part of the active investment 
process or are acting as engaged owners on the basis of their own governance 
analyses, such as asset managers. 
 Some respondents raised concern that the scope encompasses ESG rating 
agencies, not-for-profit investor organizations and information providers that only 
issue bulletins and newsletters (and not proxy recommendations or research 
specifically related to the proxy voting decision-making process). The respondents 
argued that these types of firms or market participants have different issues and 
positions in the governance framework and are already subject to other codes.5 They 
said the Principles should focus on third-party services, whereas investors that act as 
engaged owners and conduct their own governance analysis and research (also via 
collective vehicles) should be excluded from the scope. 
Further arguments raised by two or more respondents include: 
                                                          
5 E.g. UK Stewardship Code, ICGN Modern Mandate, EFAMA Code for External Governance for asset managers, 
ARISTA 3.0 for ESG rating agencies. 
 
12 Feedback Summary 
 
x Providers of services other than proxy advice have different issues;  
x Representatives from some of the industries encompassed in the scope were 
not involved in or consulted about the development of the Principles; 
x A broad scope could hinder the effectiveness of the Principles; and 
x A broad scope could result in overlap with other codes.6
Issuer group respondents did not comment on the scope of the Principles as often as 
other respondent types. However, one issuer association suggested that smaller 
organizations and those that provide services on a limited basis should be exempted 
from the Principles, unless those firms provide voting recommendations or advice. 
Another issuer association respondent said the focus of the Principles should be on 
firms that influence the voting process and recommended that governance research 
services should only be subject to the Principles if they are provided by “proxy 
advisors” that issue recommendations. 
9. Definition of “governance research services” 
Question 10 Do you agree with the definition of “governance research 
services”? Is the scope of the definition adequate? If not, please elaborate and 
provide specific suggestions. 
In addition to the above-mentioned general remarks regarding the scope of the 
Principles, some respondents provided feedback on the definition of “governance 
research services.” Four investor group respondents, one issuer association and two 
service providers approved the definitions. 
One institutional investor said the governance research services were not properly 
defined, an opinion shared by two issuer associations. In particular, it was unclear to 
some respondents whether “policy guidance” captures the implementation of custom 
voting guidelines and whether “data and analysis” refers to company-specific data or 
more general data. 
Three investor associations criticised the inclusion of ratings in the scope and said 
they were not aware that GRPs provided rating services. These respondents 
                                                          
6 E.g. stewardship codes, EFAMA Code for External Governance or the ICGN model mandate. 
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highlighted the “potential dangers of relying on sole ratings, especially in a field such 
as governance.”
10.  “Vote Agency Services” and “Engagement and Governance Overlay 
Services” 
Question 11 Are the definitions of “vote agency services” and “engagement 
and governance overlay services” and their distinction from “governance 
research services” sufficiently clear and accurate? If not, please elaborate 
Two investor associations and one service provider criticised both definitions. They 
described the definitions as “artificial” and hard to understand. According to one of 
these respondents, “companies may not fully understand how [vote agency services 
and engagement and governance overlay services] fit into the way investors 
approach their responsibilities.” Respondents said the definitions should be replaced 
with one clear definition or a more intuitive definition that features a description of 
how the services are used by investors. 
10.1. Engagement and Governance Overlay Services 
Five investor group respondents agreed with the definitions of “engagement” and 
“governance overlay services.” This opinion was shared by two issuer associations, 
one service provider and one other stakeholder. Another stakeholder said that 
“engagement and governance overlay services” should be listed as a key service 
rather than as an additional service. 
Three service providers and two investor group respondents said the definition of 
“governance research services” is confusing. They said that while “engagement and 
governance overlay services” are excluded from the scope, some of the services 
offered by engagement and governance overlay firms are not.7 These respondents 
emphasized that the responsibility for engagement with issuers lies directly with other 
stakeholders (investors and regulators) and said that GRPs should not -- unless they 
have explicit assent from clients – engage themselves. They also said the influence 
on companies and the risk for conflicts of interest could arise from engagement.  
                                                          
7 The reference to “providing regular and intellectual contributions to company-specific engagement services.”
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Similarly, two issuer associations expressed confusion about the correlation between 
the excluded and included engagement services and recommended better definitions 
for each of the categories. One issuer association said the definitions should clarify 
whether “engagement and governance overlay services” refers to services similar to 
board evaluation. 
10.2. Vote agency services 
One investor association, two service providers and three issuer associations 
expressed disappointment that the Committee excluded “vote agency services” from 
the scope of the Principles. They said the Principles should address the particularities 
of vote agency services because: 
x There is a conflict-of-interest risk for service providers when they act as a 
voting agent; 
x ESMA's work focused mainly on the voting services; and, 
x The influence on voting outcomes, as criticised by the issuer community, 
derives also from the use of voting platforms and quick-vote options.  
However, seven investor group respondents and one other stakeholder said they 
agreed with the definition of “vote agency services.” One issuer association explicitly 
agreed that “vote agency services” should be excluded from the scope because of 
the “distinct” nature of these services. 
11. Standards of Conduct for Investors  
Question 12 Do you agree that the Principles should not impose standards of 
conduct on investors? If not, please explain why.  
Many respondents took the opportunity to express their views on investor 
stewardship responsibilities and the use of GRP services in general. They stated that 
investors remain responsible for the discharge of their stewardship responsibilities. 
Respondents of all types made the point that GRPs provide important support to 
asset managers in helping them to exercise their ownership rights and 
responsibilities in an informed manner. Nevertheless, investor group and service 
provider respondents also said the influence of GRPs should not be overstated. 
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Service provider respondents said it was important to distinguish between the 
responsibilities of investors and those of GRPs and endorsed the clarification that 
research providers are solely responsible to their clients.  
Investor group respondents view GRPs as an important source of information and 
objective analysis. According to one investor association, “the proxy advisory industry 
plays a crucial, although indirect, role in enabling long-termism and restoring trust in 
the financial markets, thereby contributing to the public interest.” Eight investor group 
respondents said it was important for all GRP investor clients to have the ability to 
monitor the services provided to them and some stated that they actively do so. Two 
recommended the inclusion of a reference to investment managers’ duties with 
respect to the responsible use of GRP services and a requirement for more 
transparency on the resources investors devote to voting and stewardship. 
Nine investor group respondents agreed that the Principles should not impose 
standards of conduct on investors. In answering Question 12, these respondents said 
that:
x Investors already are subject to regulation and codes of conduct;  
x The Principles should not try to address entities with different sets of issues; 
and,  
x The conduct of investors should be addressed within an investor-focused 
initiative. 
Similarly, five service providers and one other stakeholder agreed that the Principles 
should not impose standards of conduct on investors, as they are already subject to 
regulation and abide to codes of conduct. Three service providers said clients are 
responsible for using and assessing GRP services with care and due diligence. One 
other stakeholder said investors should ensure that “they are delegating activities to 
(GRPs) that will carry out those activities in a manner consistent with their own 
approach to engagement and decision-making.” 
Among issuer respondents, six said the Principles should not regulate investors. Two 
of them suggested the development of a EU stewardship code. Two issuer 
associations disagreed and said the Principles should require investor clients of  
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GRPs to monitor their service providers. One issuer association said GRPs should 
disclose their procedures to facilitate monitoring efforts by clients. 
VI. Principle One: Service Quality (Questions 13-16) 8
12. Understanding among Stakeholders 
Question 13 Do you think that Principle One will help the market to better 
understand the different kinds of services and approaches that participants 
operate? If not, please explain. 
Seven investor group respondents said Principal One will provide a better 
understanding among stakeholders. However, two of them criticised the wording of 
Principle One as being too weak (“aim to offer…”) and recommended the language 
should be based “more on a presumption of compliance.” One investor association 
said the Guidance provided is comprehensive, but more of the Guidance should be 
shifted to the Principle itself. 
Three service providers and one other stakeholder agreed with Principle One. One 
service provider said the Principles should not introduce procedures on quality and 
independence that are too strict, as this approach could lead to an unwanted 
standardisation of GRP procedures instead of addressing respective criticism (“tick-
the-box approach”). Two service providers emphasized that the Principles should 
reflect different business models and sizes of signatories. As smaller GRPs might not 
be able to implement large structures to comply with strict procedures, they said the 
comply-or-explain framework is most appropriate. 
Four issuer associations said they believed Principle One will foster a better 
understanding in the market of the different services and approaches that signatories 
operate, while four others said the Principles are too generic and should contain 
more specific best-practice provisions or Guidance for the contents of the policy. 
Similar to some of the investor group respondents, issuer group respondents 
criticised the wording of Principle One. They said the Principles should be more 
                                                          
8 There were little or no responses to Question 17, provided feedback has been implemented in other report 
sections. 
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tightly drafted and that vague wording should be rephrased, highlighting “signatories 
aim…” or “signatories should make reasonable efforts.”
13. Issues of Service Quality  
Question 14 Do you see any issues of service quality that are not addressed in 
this section? If so, please provide examples and specific information on the 
purpose and merits of any additional disclosures. 
Investor group respondents suggested that the following additional issues should be 
addressed by the Principles: 
x Confidentiality of client information, such as holdings information and voting 
decisions; 
x Resolution of disagreements between GRPs and their clients; 
x Liability insurance of the GRP relating to the services they provide; and, 
x How GRPs could assist clients in thinking about their own voting policy. 
Two issuer associations suggested the inclusion of a Principle that would ensure 
adherence to a GRP’s own voting guidelines and policies. 
13.1. Staff  
One investor association and one service provider said the Principles should include 
best-practice provisions regarding the qualifications of the resources that develop 
and oversee the research services provided. Two investor associations said they 
would like more transparency on GRP resources, including size, experience, 
qualifications and geographical spread of the team. 
Seven issuer associations said the Principles should call for GRPs to ensure they 
have sufficient staff resources with appropriate qualifications. They called for more 
transparency on whether a GRP outsources any part of the research process and 
how much time is spent analysing each company, among other issues. Two issuer 
associations said that GRP reports should be reviewed and approved by experienced 
staff members and that reports should include the name(s) of the senior analyst(s) 
responsible for the content. 
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13.2. Accuracy of Services 
One investor association and one service provider called for the addition of best-
practice provisions designed to safeguard the accuracy of research. Similarly, seven 
issuer associations proposed provisions for systems and controls that would ensure 
the reliability, accuracy and timeliness of information such as verification of data and 
double checking. 
One institutional investor said the research policy should outline procedures for 
identification and correction of errors with respect to provided services. Similar 
suggestions were made by six issuer associations. Two issuer associations said 
GRPs should be required to produce annual statistical reporting of complaints and 
factual errors.  
13.3. Stakeholder Feedback 
Two issuer associations said the Principles should not only require disclosure of the 
mechanisms employed by GRPs for receiving and incorporating feedback but should 
be prescriptive regarding appropriate mechanisms. Correspondingly one investor 
association and one service provider recommended best-practice provisions on 
dealing with client views. 
13.4. Additional Transparency 
Two or more investor group respondents said the Principles should call for enhanced 
transparency to clients on the following issues: 
x Ownership structure and types of provided services to assess potential 
conflicts of interest; 
x Information that allows an assessment of the continuing capacity of the GRP 
(e.g., ownership, staffing and financial position);  
x Compliance with client instructions;  
x Whether the vote was cast correctly in accordance with client instructions (for 
both house policy and custom policy clients) and in proportion to the different 
instructions from different clients; and, 
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x Whether or not the GRP evaluates financial transactions and, if that is the 
case, the relevant experience and expertise of the analysts responsible for 
such research. 
Two service providers would like GRPs to disclose the percentage of clients that vote 
according to house voting guidelines. They argue that a GRP’s guidelines influences 
best-practice standards if a large proportion of owners follow this policy. 
14. Transparency on consideration of local-market conditions  
Question 15 Do you think the disclosure of the research policy, voting 
guidelines and research methodologies will enable stakeholders to determine 
how signatories consider local-market conditions? If not, please provide 
reasons. 
One issuer association, one other stakeholder and seven investor group respondents 
said the disclosure of research policies, guidelines and methodologies will enable 
stakeholders to understand the degree to which GRPs consider local-market 
conditions in the development of their research reports. However, three of them 
added that the value of this disclosure depends on the practical implementation of 
the Principles and “how detailed and contextual” the disclosures are. Consequently, 
two investor associations recommended that GRPs disclose not only the extent to 
which local conditions are taken into account but also how this is reflected in their 
policies and methodologies. Other investor group respondents called for monitoring 
of disclosures by an independent committee to ensure they are meaningful.  
One investor respondent and four issuer associations said some of the language in 
the Guidance – specifically “signatories should take into account local-market 
conditions” – could better serve as a Principle, while the related Guidance should 
feature examples of how this might be implemented. One issuer association also said 
the wording of the Principles and Guidance is not “explicit” enough. As written, this
respondent said the wording would not compel signatories to provide meaningful 
information regarding how they consider local-market conditions. 
Other suggestions include: 
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x GRPs should draft specific guidelines (that are publicly disclosed or available 
to clients) to ensure the consideration of local-market conditions; 
x The Principles should explicitly state that GRPs make recommendations on 
the basis of individual analysis and should not encourage a “check-the-box” 
approach; and, 
x Issuers should be engaged in the development of house voting guidelines to 
provide a full picture of the written and unwritten local governance traditions.  
15. Scope and Content of the Proposed Research-Related Disclosure  
Question 16 Please express your views on the scope and content of the 
proposed research-related disclosure under this principle with respect, to: a. 
research policy; b. voting guidelines; c. research methodologies 
Five investor group respondents said they agree with the proposed research-related 
disclosure. One institutional investor said GRPs should disclose analytical methods 
and the rationale for the vote recommendations in their reports (and not to the 
public). One institutional investor and two issuer associations said GRP voting 
guidelines should explain to what extent issuer explanations on deviation from 
comply-or-explain corporate governance codes are taken into account. 
One service provider said GRPs should not provide voting recommendations based 
on a house policy, as it believes this dissuades investors from exercising their 
responsibilities. One investor association said investor clients should “take active 
responsibility for ensuring that the approach of their providers, especially in regards 
to the recommendation and execution of votes, is congruent with their wider 
communication with investee companies and in both the investors’ and the 
company’s long-term interest.” Six issuer associations and three investor group 
respondents said the Principles should require disclosure of GRP research 
methodologies. 
15.1. Disclosure of the voting guidelines 
With respect to voting guidelines, two issuer associations said the Guidance does not 
sufficiently clarify exactly what should be disclosed (and what could remain 
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confidential). Issuer associations said they support the public disclosure of voting 
guidelines. Four issuer associations said the Principles should require disclosure of 
voting guidelines (and respective updates) sufficiently ahead of general meetings. 
One issuer association said voting guidelines should be provided to the national 
regulator. 
Four issuer associations and one other stakeholder said GRPs should consult or 
engage with stakeholders and/or provide a public feedback mechanism as part of 
their voting guidelines development process. 
15.2. Amendments to the policies 
Regarding voting guidelines and research policies, respondents said:  
x They should be tailored for each market and consider local-market conditions;  
x They should contain definitions of concepts that are used; and, 
x They should include a statement for fair treatment of corporate governance 
issues across markets. 
VII. Principle Two: Conflicts of Interest (Questions 18-20)9
Two investor associations and one service provider said that some concepts and 
terms included in Principle Two should be more clearly defined or explained, such as 
“conflict of interest,” “material impact,” “material conflicts” and “investor-client 
influence.” Also one issuer association said they would like clarification on the 
concept of “conflict of interest.”
16. Conflicts of Interest - Relevant Issues  
Question 18 Does Principle Two address the relevant issues or considerations 
relating to potential conflicts of interest in the provision of governance 
research? If not, please explain. 
Six investor group respondents, five issuer associations and one other stakeholder 
agree that Principle Two addresses the relevant issues relating to conflicts of interest. 
                                                          
9 There were little or no responses to Question 21, provided feedback has been implemented in other report 
sections. 
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However, three issuer associations criticized the disclosure-oriented approach of the 
Principle and recommended specific measures to avoid conflicts 
Respondents frequently mentioned the provision of consulting services to investee 
companies as a potential source of conflicts of interest. Three investor associations, 
three service providers and nine issuer associations discussed this type of potential 
conflict. 
x Two service providers and two issuer associations said the Principles should 
contain requirements for always explicitly disclosing to clients material conflicts 
and/or for disclosing such conflicts in the relevant research reports; 
x Two investor associations and two service providers recommended that the 
Statement of Compliance should contain descriptions of the ownership 
structure of the signatory, the services it provides and the types of clients it 
services, thereby enabling clients to determine what potential conflicts using 
this GRP presents;  
x Four issuer associations said GRPs that provide governance research 
services to institutional investors and consulting services to issuers should 
establish Chinese walls between the businesses; and, 
x One issuer association recommended that GRPs providing both research 
services to investors and consulting services to issuers should separate those 
businesses, while two other issuer associations said GRPs should be 
prohibited from issuing voting recommendations on issuers to which they 
currently or previously provided consulting services. Similarly, two service 
providers said GRPs should be restricted from providing services to investee 
companies under certain circumstances.10 One investor association said it 
would support such restrictions. 
                                                          
10 “We suggest that research providers commit themselves not to directly provide any advisory services to listed 
companies under coverage for research, unless the potential buyers of researches and/or papers are not known 
(i.e., through a sale “over-the-counter” or through intermediaries).”
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17. Conflict Management and Mitigation Procedures  
Question 19 Do you agree with the proposed conflict management and 
mitigation procedures? If not, please explain why and what additional 
measures you would propose. 
With respect to the mitigation procedures, six investor group respondents, three 
service providers, one issuer association and one other stakeholder approved the 
conflict management and mitigation procedures outlined in the Principles.  
However, two investor associations requested more specific best-practice provisions 
and one service provider said the Guidance should contain more direction on conflict-
of-interest management. Another issuer association recommended more Guidance 
on the contents of the policy. 
Two issuer associations said the Guidance on conflicts of interest should not only 
address disclosure requirements but should feature provisions on the establishment 
of specific policies, procedures and organizational structures that mitigate conflicts. 
Similarly, three investor group respondents said the Principles focus too much on the 
publication of a conflict-of-interest policy but lack precision with respect to the 
disclosure of conflicts of interest to clients. They, as well as two service providers and 
one issuer association, expressed interest in seeing more specific disclosure on 
actual conflicts of interest. Respondents said GRPs should make their conflicts-of-
interest policy publicly available, as this would enhance transparency and, according 
to one investor association, would provide “corporates and other stakeholders with an 
interest in the activities of this industry with a level of assurance that potential 
conflicts of interests are dealt with.” Two issuer associations recommended 
disclosure of the conflicts-of-interest policy within or as an addendum to the 
Statement of Compliance.  
One investor association said the conflict-of-interest policy of GRPs should be at a 
higher level compared to their research policies and “house” voting guidelines and 
should govern the provided services. 
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18. Disclosure of Material Conflicts  
Question 20 Do you agree with the proposed approach on disclosure of 
material conflicts? If not, please explain.
Several respondents expressed confusion regarding what types of conflicts of 
interest signatories would be expected to disclose in order to comply with the 
Principles. The respondents highlighted discrepancies among the policy and 
disclosure sections of Principle 2 with respect to “potential conflicts,” “potential 
material conflicts,” and “conflict of interest that cannot be effectively managed.”
18.1. Disclosure to clients 
One service provider and one stakeholder said the approach outlined in the 
Principles for disclosure of material conflicts is appropriate. 
Six investor group respondents said all conflicts of interest should be disclosed to 
clients, irrespective of whether they are material or they can be managed effectively. 
Proponents of this argument argued that GRP investor clients should be sufficiently 
informed to be able to make their own assessment of whether a conflict is material to 
the services provided or if the management of the conflict is appropriate.  
However, four issuer associations and one investor association said if a conflict 
cannot be effectively managed, the affected signatory “should remove the conflict by 
ceasing to act for a particular client,” as disclosure would not be sufficient to resolve 
the issue. In this context, two issuer associations said the bullet point “manage the 
conflict as further detailed” is contradictory or confusing.
18.2. Form and Timing of the Disclosure 
Due to the high volumes and compressed timeframes associated with proxy voting, 
one respondent said it should be made as easy as possible for clients to assess any 
potential or real conflicts of interest. Three investor associations and two issuer 
associations said they would like the disclosure to also contain a description of the 
applied conflict-mitigation measures. Another issuer association said that a blanket 
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disclosure about potential conflicts or a list of issuers that may receive consulting 
services is not satisfactory. 
Two investor associations said material conflicts should be disclosed as soon as 
possible and before the service is provided rather than only at the time of the delivery 
of the service. Three issuer associations and one institutional investor recommended 
that if a potential conflict impacts a specific research product, the conflict should be 
disclosed within that product. 
18.3. Disclosure to non-clients 
One service provider said it does not think GRPs should disclose specific conflicts to 
the public. One investor association recommended that the issue of disclosing 
conflicts of interest to non-clients should be considered in the signatories’ policy for 
communicating with the public. Another investor association said that any conflict of 
interest should be disclosed on the website of the service provider, together with the 
mitigation procedures. 
Disclosure to non-clients received more support from issuer associations than other 
respondent types. They recommended: 
x The disclosure of potential conflicts to the public in addition to the disclosure to 
clients (two respondents); 
x The disclosure of conflicts of interest to ESMA or a monitoring board (one 
respondent); and, 
x The disclosure of all conflicts concerning the issuance of voting 
recommendations to the public (one respondent). 
VIII. Principle Three: Communication (Question 22-25) 
19. Policy Disclosure  
Question 22 Please express your views on the scope and content of the 
proposed policy disclosure under this principle with respect to: a. Issuers, b. 
Media and c. the Public. 
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19.1. Policy Approach 
One investor association respondent said Principle Three, as developed, is less 
prescriptive than ESMA’s recommendations. Similarly, one investor association and 
one service provider said the Principle lacks best-practice provisions on the dialogue 
with issuers.  
Service providers and investor group respondents highlighted the importance of 
independent research. In general, they promoted dialogue on corporate governance 
issues among relevant stakeholders and said they don’t think the Principles should 
prescribe a particular communication approach for signatories. 
Issuer associations emphasised the importance of dialogue between issuers and 
GRPs, which they believe can enhance understanding of issuers’ particularities, 
provide a better understanding of issuers’ explanations for any deviation from 
comply-or-explain corporate governance codes and improve the quality of GRP 
advice.  
Still, opinions are divided: Six issuer associations said the Principles should require 
dialogue between issuers and GRPs. Indeed, they expressed criticism of the 
Principles for leaving it up to the signatory to decide whether or not to have dialogue 
with issuers. Four other issuer associations expressed no objection to the policy 
approach. One issuer association said they would like to see more Guidance for the 
contents of the policy.  
One other stakeholder said it supports the policy approach for communications with 
media, issuers and the public. It said GRPs should not be forced to engage with 
issuers. Another stakeholder, who also does not object to the policy approach, said 
the policy should contain minimum standards. 
19.2. Transparency 
Eight investor group respondents expressed strong support for disclosure of matters 
relating to communication between GRPs and issuers. While some investor group 
respondents said GRPs should inform clients of their general approach to 
communication with issuers, others said they would like to see additional disclosure 
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on the nature, content and context of the dialogue, including whether full reports or 
no recommendations or opinions are provided to issuers to review. Six respondents 
called for disclosure on the outcome of the dialogue, in particular whether and how 
the research and subsequent recommendations have been influenced by the 
dialogue. One investor association said that when and how dialogue with issuers is 
disclosed to clients should not be subject to GRP discretion. 
Five service providers also stressed the importance of transparency regarding 
dialogue with issuers, including whether dialogue has taken place, the contents of the 
dialogue and whether the dialogue had an impact on a signatory’s research, 
recommendations or advice. 
One issuer association called for more ex-post transparency on the engagement with 
market participants, in particular whether there has been dialogue, if and how 
feedback was taken into account and whether issuers were given the opportunity to 
review and/or fact-check the research. However, one issuer association said 
discussions with companies should remain confidential.11
20. Issuer Related Dialogue  
Question 23 Are there any other aspects of issuer-related dialogue that should 
be taken into account? If yes, please elaborate and provide specific examples 
and/or suggestions. 
20.1. Initial Check by Issuers  
One investor association said that a best-practice provision should be included in the 
Principles to address the provision of voting analyses to issuers before publication. 
However, opinions on this topic vary among investor group respondents: While three 
respondents have no reservations about providing issuers a with preview of the 
report (including one who said they would prefer that the Principles compel 
signatories to make their reports available for review to issuers in advance of 
finalizing and publishing them), seven others said they do not fully endorse this 
practice.  These respondents said providing issuers with a preview of the report could 
                                                          
11 The respondent apparently means the content of the discussion, as it later suggests that ”GRPs should 
disclose whether or not they have engaged with the issuer”.
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impact the independence of GRP advice. Two investor associations said GRPs 
should ensure that the contact person of the relevant company is duly authorised to 
speak with them and that the information provided to GRPs is not privileged or 
confidential. 
Fourteen issuer associations said GRPs should provide issuers with draft reports (or 
parts thereof) prior to publication to clients and should give issuers a reasonable 
amount of time to verify and respond to the information. Seven issuer associations 
said the Principles should require publication or release of dissenting issuer opinions 
in, or in conjunction with, the final report that is sent to clients. Some issuer 
association respondents said GRPs should provide their reports free of charge to the 
subject issuers. Four issuer associations said they would like transparency on 
whether GRPs allow validation of reports by issuers. 
20.2. Feedback and Corrections 
One investor association said the Principles should include a best-practice provision 
on the management of report feedback from issuers and GRP investor clients, in 
order to ensure accuracy. This respondent also said the Principles should include a 
provision regarding the disclosure of corrections made based on issuer feedback. On 
the other hand, one institutional investor said that research outputs should “by their 
nature not be subject to review and/or change as a result of company input or 
opinion.”
One issuer association said issuers would like information on the research process 
and on what influences voting decisions. Another issuer association said reports 
should be made public after the shareholder meeting for academic purposes or ex-
post analysis by issuers. 
21. Dialogue with Media and Public  
Question 24 Are there any other aspects of media and the public dialogue that 
should take into account? If yes, please elaborate and provide specific 
examples and/or suggestions. 
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Respondents from all groups -- four investor group respondents, two service 
providers, five issuer associations and one other stakeholder -- expressed concern 
regarding dialogue between GRPs and the media and public. Two investor group 
respondents expressed support for the development and disclosure by signatories of 
a policy for communication with the media and public, saying public communication 
“is a major reputational issue” and that they have “concerns if proxy advisors 
comment publicly on proxy battles, indicating what their vote recommendation will 
be.” One other stakeholder was critical of the Principle, saying it does not set 
minimum standards for the policy. 
Three investor group respondents raised concerns about the risks inherent in 
communication with the media and public, including liability risks for GRPs and 
improper disclosure of confidential client information. Two investor associations 
emphasized that such dialogue should not happen without the agreement of clients 
on the approach. One service provider said GRPs should not publicly disclose their 
voting recommendations because doing so could inhibit a fair voting process. 
According to the respondent, “issuers or dissident shareholders may take advantage 
of the disclosure to foresee the final outcome of the meeting or to put pressure on 
some institutional investors to change their voting position.”
Four issuer associations highlighted the importance of factual accuracy when 
communicating with the media, as well as the negative consequences for both 
issuers and GRPs when errors occur. One respondent said the Principles should 
contain more “cautionary notes” on providing unchecked information to the press or 
public. Three of them recommended that there should be a verification of facts with 
issuers before making public disclosures or comments. Two issuer associations said 
the policy should also contain procedures for dealing with errors. 
22. Further Guidance for Potential Signatories  
Question 25 For additional potential signatories only: Does the Guidance 
provide you with the information you need to properly apply Principle Three? If 
not, where would you prefer further Guidance? 
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One service provider said it agreed with Principle Three, while two others requested 
further specific Guidance and best-practice provisions on transparency regarding the 
dialogue with issuers and its impact on GRP research. 
IX. General Features of The Principles  
23. Additional Comments  
Question 26 In addition to comments on the specific questions addressed in 
the remainder of this Consultation Document, views are invited on the general 
approach taken by the Committee and the general features of the Principles. 
Question 28 Do you have any other comments that the Committee should take 
into account when finalising the Principles? 
One investor association said competition and concentration issues remain a 
problem, while another said the Principles failed to address the operational barriers 
that can impact the exercising of voting rights. One Investor association and one 
issuer association said stakeholders should join the committee. 
Other respondents suggested the Principles: 
x Should require disclosure on specific topics that a GRP covers, such as 
environmental and social issues.  
x Should state that signatories should not be allowed to act on behalf of 
particular shareholders or issuers in attempting to influence voting, even if that 
activity is disclosed. 
x Should address the consequences of non-compliance with the Principles or 
the statement of compliance. 
x Should require more transparency on compliance with client instructions. 
24. ESMA Policy Principles  
Question 27 Do you feel that the Principles meet the policy Principles set forth 
in ESMA’s Final Report? If not, please explain. 
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Four investor group respondents, one service provider, one other stakeholder and 
one issuer association said the proposed Principles are in line with the Principles 
ESMA set forth in its Final Report and said they encompass the relevant issues.  
Two issuer associations said the focus of the Principles on service quality, conflicts of 
interest management and communication policies is appropriate, as these are “the 
key areas in which best practice principles need to be established.”
In answering this question, some respondents cited concerns about the broad scope 
of the Principles. One investor association said “the Principles need to be much more 
focused on a specific constituency – i.e. those whose research or advice directly 
relates to the informed voting of proxies” in order to fulfil the remit detailed in the 
ESMA Final Report. Two investor associations and two issuer associations also 
criticised the high-level nature and the wording of the Principles. 
One issuer association said that while the development of the Principles for GRPs 
fulfils the remit of ESMA outlined in the ESMA Final Report, “any problem[s] lie not so 
much with the activities of GRPs as with the way in which some (although by no 
means all) investors and other stakeholders use their services.”
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Amundi (FR) 
Association of British Insurers/ABI (UK) 
Assonime (IT) 
Aviva Investors (UK) 
Belgian Asset Managers 
Association/BEAMA (BE) 
Blackrock (Global) 
Capita Asset Services (UK) 
Center On Executive 
Compensation/COEC (USA) 
CFA Institute (USA) 
Church Investors Group/CIG (UK) 
Confederation of British Industry’s/CBI 
(UK) 
Deutsches Aktieninstitut e.V./DAI (GER) 
Dutch Association of Listed 
Companies/VEUO (NL) 
Egan-Jones Proxy Services (UK) 
Emiliano Torracca (UK) 
Eumedion (NL) 
European Fund and Asset Management 
Association/EFAMA (EU) 
European Issuers/EI (BE) 
European Sustainable Investment 
Forum/Eurosif (BE) 
F&C Management Limited (UK) 
Federation of German Industries/BDI 
(GER) 
Financial Reporting Council/FRC (UK) 
Frontis Governance (IT) 
GC100 (UK) 
German Commission for the German 
Corporate Governance Code (GER) 
Global Network of Director Institutes/GNDI 
(AUS) 
Hermes Equity Ownership Services/EOS 
(UK), 
ICMA Asset Management and Investors 
Council/AMIC (UK) 
International Corporate Governance 
Network/ICGN (UK) 
IR Society (UK) 
MIROVA (FR) 
National Association of Pension 
Funds/NAPF (UK) 
NEI Investments (CA) 
Nordic Investor Services/NIS (SE) 
Quoted Companies Alliance/QCA (UK) 
RPMI Railpen(UK) 
Shareholder Communications 
Coalition/SCC (USA) 
SNS Asset Management (NL) 
Sodali (Global)  
The Association of Investment 
Companies/AIC (UK) 
The French Association of Large 
Companies/AFEP (FR) 
The Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators/ICSA (UK) 
The Investment Management 
Association/IMA(UK) 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USA) 
Verband der Chemischen Industrie/VCI 
(GER) 
Vereniging VEB NCVB (NL) 
Responses received can be found at http://bppgrp.info/?page_id=111.
